Confining data and processes in global computing applications  by De Nicola, Rocco et al.
Science of Computer Programming 63 (2006) 57–87
www.elsevier.com/locate/scico
Confining data and processes in global computing applicationsI
Rocco De Nicolaa, Daniele Gorlab,a,∗, Rosario Pugliesea
aDipartimento di Sistemi e Informatica, Universita` di Firenze, Italy
bDipartimento di Informatica, Universita` di Roma “La Sapienza”, Italy
Received 15 May 2004; received in revised form 15 April 2005; accepted 15 July 2005
Available online 24 July 2006
Abstract
A programming notation is introduced that can be used for protecting secrecy and integrity of data in global computing
applications. The approach is based on the explicit annotations of data and network nodes. Data are tagged with information
about the allowed movements, network nodes are tagged with information about the nodes that can send data and spawn processes
to them. The annotations are used to confine movements of data and processes. The approach is illustrated by applying it to three
paradigmatic calculi for global computing, namely CKLAIM (a calculus at the basis of CKLAIM), Dpi (a distributed version of the
pi -calculus) and Mobile Ambients Calculus. For all of these formalisms, it is shown that their semantics guarantees that
computations proceed only while respecting confinement constraints. Namely, it is proven that, after successful static type checking,
data can reside at and cross only authorised nodes. “Local” formulations of this property where only relevant subnets type check
are also presented. Finally, the theory is tested by using it to model secure behaviours of a UNIX-like multiuser system.
c© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In the design of programming languages for global computing, the integration of security mechanisms is a major
challenge and great efforts have been recently devoted to embedding such mechanisms within standard programming
features. Several language-based security techniques have been proposed that range from type systems [19,4,2,13],
to data flow analysis [16,25,9,1], from in-lined reference monitoring [10] to proof-carrying code [24]. We refer the
reader to [26] for an overview of some of these techniques.
The major goal of language-based security is to design languages that are flexible, expressive and safe.
Unfortunately, these are often contrasting requirements. For example, mobile code deeply increases flexibility and
thus expressivity of programming languages, but introduces new security problems related to unwanted accesses to
classified data. Indeed, when programming has to take into account networks with mobile agents, existence in the
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environment of malicious principals, that can put security of data at risk, must be assumed. Malicious nodes can
attack a mobile process and compromise its integrity through code modification or its secrecy through leakage of
sensitive data. But one has also to take into account existence of malicious mobile processes that might attempt to
access or forge private data of the network nodes hosting them.
A programming language for global computing should thus be equipped with a foundational model that also
encompasses security features; the proof that an application is ‘safe’ could then be done by relying on formal
methods. In our view, the language security model should consider existence of misbehaving entities in the execution
environment of applications. Moreover, only local knowledge of the environment can be assumed because it would be
impossible to collect global information in a network with possibly malicious nodes under the control of thousands
different administrative authorities.
The major contribution of this paper is the definition of an approach that permits protecting the secrecy of data
residing on hosting nodes and that of data carried by mobile processes by relying on program annotation. Our approach
is inspired by Confined-λ [20] and relies on annotating data with sets of node addresses, called regions, that specify the
network nodes that can interact with them. Also nodes may have annotations that specify which nodes can send data
and spawn processes to them. Data annotations enable programmers to control the set of nodes that can share specific
data, and permit shading them from other nodes. Node annotations, instead, enable node administrators to control the
set of data and processes each node can host; thus, the node can refuse malicious processes and unwanted data.
The language semantics is then designed to guarantee that computations proceed while respecting the region
constraints. For example, a process P can access a datum d only if P’s execution does not export d outside the
data region, say r , i.e. if P only writes d in network nodes included in r or, similarly, if P only carries d while
migrating to nodes included in r . Enforcing similar constraints requires a form of code inspection that is performed,
as much as possible, statically thus relieving the runtime semantics of the burden to make expensive checks and, then,
improving efficiency. In Section 2 we shall introduce more details and a simple motivating example.
Our approach is largely independent of a specific model. Indeed, we shall show how it can be applied to different
process calculi for mobile processes. These calculi have greatly improved the formal understanding of the complex
mechanisms underlying global computing but, although share similar intentions and motivations, rest on different
design choices. Usually, they permit describing both single processes, and nets of located, possibly migrating,
processes. Nets are collections of nodes that can be thought of as physically distributed machines or as logical
partitions of the same machine. Each node is referrable via an address, is connected to other nodes and hosts a set of
processes. Depending on the design choices of the calculus, e.g. nets may be plain or hierarchically structured, and the
notions of process, node and net may collapse. In the most basic setting, processes are built up from the empty process
and from the basic actions by using standard operators, e.g., action prefixing, name restriction, parallel composition
and replication. The basic actions permit data exchange, spawning of new, possibly remote, processes and creation of
new resources.
In this paper, we apply the approach to three paradigmatic calculi for global computing, that are sufficiently
different to provide evidence of the generality of our approach. We shall consider CKLAIM (core KLAIM [14],
a simplified version of KLAIM [8]) in Section 3, Dpi (Distributed pi -calculus [19], a distributed variant of the pi -
calculus [23]) in Section 4, and Mobile Ambients Calculus [5] in Section 5. For each of these calculi, we add regions
information to the syntax of terms, define a type system and an operational semantics that take annotations into
account, and prove that the semantics guarantees that computations proceed only while respecting confinements.
Thus, after successful static type checking, one can guarantee that data are manipulated only by authorised users.
Moreover, since in such dynamic environments we cannot assume knowledge of the whole net, we also establish
a more general result, namely that absence of violations of data annotations is guaranteed for all successfully type
checked subnets, regardless of the configuration and of the evolution of the whole net they are in. In Section 6 we
illustrate our approach by means of a significative example, where we model the secure implementation of a UNIX-
like multiuser system. Comments on the differences between the three typing systems and about future and related
work are postponed to Section 7.
2. Controlling data movement via types
As stated in the Introduction, we would like to set up a machinery based on typing that helps in protecting
exchanged and local data in global computing applications. To this aim, we suggest annotating data with sets of
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network addresses, describing the subnet where data can be used; these sets will be called regions. The annotations
allow programmers to fix the nodes that can share a given datum, and to avoid that the datum is accessed by untrusted
processes (from untrusted nodes). Also network nodes are annotated with regions that specify the nodes that can send
data and those that can spawn processes to them. This mechanism allows the administrator of a node to control the
data/processes the node can host, and to refuse malicious processes and unwanted data. Thus, nodes are annotated
with two regions, say rd and rp. We should have rp ⊆ rd since accepting processes is, in general, more dangerous
than accepting data; however, no restriction on the model is imposed to deal with this issue.
Our typing approach can be implemented by letting regions to be either finite subsets of addresses and input
parameters or the distinct element> (used to refer to the whole net). The set of all regions R , ranged over by r , can be
partially ordered by the subset inclusion relation ⊆, and has > as top element. Data annotation is rendered as [data]r ;
we shall assume that absence of region annotations stands for >.
The language semantics guarantees that computations proceed according to region constraints. This property, that
we call safety, can be stated as
A net N is safe if, for any datum d occurring in N associated to region r and for all possible evolutions of N , it
holds that d will only cross and reside at nodes whose addresses are in r .
To better understand the properties we want to model and the impact of our approach on system security, we present a
simple example that, for the time being, is modelled by means of a sort of abstract language (in the following sections,
the same example shall be modelled by exploiting each of the calculi we mentioned in the previous section). Operator
‘.’ stands for action prefixing while ‘∗’ denotes replication of processes. We assume the following process actions:
• SND(data, tgt) sends the information data by exploiting the communication medium tgt;
• RCV(par, tgt) receives from the communication medium tgt information that is then bound to parameter par;
• RES(name) creates a fresh name name, and restricts its visibility to the creating process, shading the name to any
other process of the net.
Moreover, we shall use function access( ) for associating ‘access points’ to nodes. The exact nature of the access
points and of the communication medium tgt, and the way SND and RCV exchange data depends on the chosen
communication paradigm. For instance, in case of channel-based synchronous communication, access(addrS) will
return a valid channel for communicating with addrS , tgt will be a suitable communication channel and actions
SND/RCV will be executed simultaneously.
For the sake of simplicity, in the following and in the other examples we shall use polyadic communication,
although we develop our theoretical framework by considering the monadic and first order variants of the calculi. Here
we further rely on remote communications and on a mechanism that permits decomposing received data according to
the structure of the parameters specified for receiving them.
Let us now describe the scenario we want to model. Suppose that a client C requires a service to a server S. Once
S has verified the credentials of C (e.g. its identity or its credit card information), it sends back a secret password,
that C can change. C could then access the service by using the last set password. This protocol can be modelled by
assuming two network addresses, addrC and addrS , hosting the processes PC and PS , respectively, that are defined
below.
PC , SND(addrC , [creditCard info]{addrC ,addrS}, access(addrS)).
RCV(y, access(addrC )). < modify password y and access the service >
PS , ∗RCV(x1, x2, access(addrS)). < check credit card info x2 > .
RES(PWD).SND([PWD]{x1,addrS} , access(x1)).
< handle password modifications and provide the service >
Notice that, since the information on C’s credit card is marked with region {addrC , addrS}, only processes at the
locations of C and S will be enabled to capture C’s request. Thus, no attacks mounted from other nodes aimed at
cancelling the request can take place. Similar considerations do hold for the restricted name PWD that S sends back
to C (it represents a secret password shared between processes at C’s and S’s locations).
To make our theoretical framework properly working, we need to control the processes arriving at C’s and S’s
locations; this is why our typing discipline requires also nodes to be annotated with regions. Server S can then accept
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Table 1
CKLAIM syntax
l, h, k, . . . ∈ L LOCALITY NAMES
x, y, z, . . . VARIABLES
` ::= l | x IDENTIFIERS
T ::= ` | ! x TEMPLATES
N ::= l rd :: rp P | N1 ‖ N2 NETS
P ::= PROCESSES
nil (empty)
| 〈[l]r 〉 (datum)
| α.P (prefixing)
| P1 | P2 (parallel composition)
| ∗P (replication)
α ::= ACTIONS
out([`′]r )@` (send)
| in(T )@` (receive)
| eval(P)@` (execute)
| newloc(l) (creation/restriction)
only processes coming from trusted nodes, but it should accept data coming from any user; this is necessary to model a
setting where S accepts any service request, while it supplies the service only to accredited users. It has to be said that
we are implicitly assuming the ability of determining the origin (the source node) of data and processes. By relying
on it, we can then check compliance with regions annotations.
In the example above we have exploited remote communication; if only local communication is allowed, we would
need to replace SND(. . . , access(addrS)) with something like EXEC( SND(. . . , access(addrS)), addrS), supposing
that EXEC(P, dest) spawns process P for execution to the node with address dest.
3. CKLAIM: Core KLAIM
We start by applying our approach to CKLAIM [14], a calculus at the core of the language KLAIM (Kernel Language
for Agents Interaction and Mobility, [8]). The theory developed here simplifies that of [15] because the calculus only
permits monadic communication and uses replication (instead of recursion) to model infinite behaviours.
The syntax of CKLAIM is given in Table 1. There is only one category of names, namely that of locality names L ,
ranged over by l. Identifiers, ranged over by `, can be locality names or variables (ranged over by x), and represent
both the communicable data and the target of (possibly remote) actions. T denotes templates for pattern matching and
may either be a parameter !x , for some variable x , or a locality name. Data are represented as special processes 〈l〉, thus
we may say that each node hosts processes and a (possibly empty) multiset of data. In the following, we assume that
in (well-formed) processes data are never prefixed by an action or replication. By using LINDA [11] terminology, we
shall call the tuple space (TS, for short) the multiset of data hosted by a node and we let it to represent the repository
of the node. Communication can be remote and relies on multiple distributed tuple spaces. CKLAIM nodes are written
l rd :: rp P . The two region annotations control the nodes that can send data or processes to l, as established by the
node administrator. Process actions are:
• out([`′]r )@`: creates a new datum `′ (whose region is r ) in the TS at `.
• in(T )@`: if T = !x , a datum 〈l〉 is withdrawn from the TS at ` and x is replaced by l in the continuation; if T = `′,
then the action will look for (and retrieve) a datum 〈`′〉 at the TS of node ` (if any). This second kind of input action
is a form of name matching operator.
• eval(P)@`: spawns process P for execution to the node referred to by `.
• newloc(l): creates a fresh locality name l that is used as the address of a new node tagged by the region annotations
of the creating one and hosting process nil.
Identifiers occurring in process terms can be bound. More precisely, prefix in(!x)@`.P binds variable x , while
newloc(l).P binds locality l; in both cases, P is the scope of the binding. An identifier that is not bound is called free.
We let FV(P) to denote the set of free variables in P . As usual, α-conversion allows to freely rename bound identifiers
without captures. In the sequel, we shall assume that bound identifiers in processes are all distinct and different from
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the free ones (this is always possible by using α-conversion). Finally, we shall only consider for execution closed nets,
i.e. nets where each occurrence of a variable is bound by an in prefix (similarly to many real compilers, we consider
terms with free variables as programming errors). In the rest of the paper, we will omit trailing occurrences of the
empty process, as usual.
3.1. Typing CKLAIM nets
The language presented in the previous section is a mean to program applications where, during the computation,
a datum can only appear in localities contained in its region annotation. The runtime semantics can enforce this
requirement by performing appropriate checks. These (runtime) checks are necessary because the pattern matching-
based communication does not permit making any static assumption on the actual structure of tuples hosted by a
tuple space. To make the semantics as efficient as possible, a preliminary typing phase is introduced. Static typing of
CKLAIM nets aims at guaranteeing that:
(1) a datum [l]r can be seen at (i.e. can cross) ` if ` ∈ r
(2) a process retrieving a datum [l]r cannot exhibit l outside r .
The typing phase performs check 1. statically and annotates parameters occurring in templates with regions to enable
efficient execution of check 2. at runtime. To better distinguish the annotations put by the programmers/administrators
from those put by the type system, we shall write the latter ones as superscripts and the former ones as subscripts.
Hence, the syntax of templates becomes
T ::= ` | [! x]r
Intuitively, [! x]r states that the datum replacing x will cross at most the localities in r .
The typing procedure for CKLAIM nets is given in Table 2. Net typings are written N  N ′. The typing step
includes a type checking phase, to verify that nets are written according to the region annotations therein, and a type
inference phase, to annotate parameters occurring in templates. Intuitively, the inference phase takes a net N (written
according to the syntax in Table 1) and returns a net N ′ obtained from N by annotating all the parameters with a
region containing the nodes that the received values will cross. E.g., in process in(!x)@l.out([x]r )@l ′ the declaration
!x of variable x must be associated to region r . The type checker verifies that each process located at a node l contains
only data that can be seen by l (this is done by the judgement l ) and verifies that actions out and eval send data/code
to nodes where the data/code can appear without violating the region annotations.
Judgement  relies on an auxiliary procedure Γ ` P ` Γ ′ ` P ′ where the type environment Γ is a finite
map from variables to regions such that FV(P) ⊆ dom(Γ ). Thus, the procedure ∅ ` P ` ∅ ` P ′ is defined only
if P is closed; in that case, for each parameter in P , a region annotation describing the use of that parameter in the
continuation process (i.e. where it will be sent) is determined and used to decorate P (thus obtaining P ′). Such regions
are determined by the type inference by considering the locality where the process runs (the ` decorating `) and by
examining the localities where the variables can appear upon execution of actions out and/or eval. Notice, however,
that care is needed to avoid that closed nets become open. As an example, consider the nodes (both of them are legal)
l :: in(!x)@l ′.in(!y)@l ′′.out([x]{l,y})@l (?)
l :: in(!y)@l ′.out([y]{l,y})@l (??)
Blindly annotating these nodes would result in
l :: in([!x]{l,y})@l ′.in([!y]{l})@l ′′.out([x]{l,y})@l
l :: in([!y]{l,y})@l ′.out([y]{l,y})@l
that are open because of the occurrence of y in the regions of !x and !y, respectively. The solution we designed to
accept (?) is to assign !x the region annotation >. This is reasonable since in([!x]{l,y})@l ′ means ‘retrieve a datum
from l ′ and share it with a generic locality of the net’ (indeed y can be dynamically replaced with any locality name).
The solution we designed to accept (??) is to remove y from !y region annotation and assume that a locality can
always occur in the node having that locality as address.
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Table 2
Typing procedure for CKLAIM
Typing Nets:
(CK-T-NET)
N1  N ′1 N2  N ′2
N1 ‖ N2  N ′1 ‖ N ′2
(CK-T-NODE)
rd , rp ∈ {>} ∪ 2L ∅ ` P l ∅ ` P ′
l rd :: rp P  l rd :: rp P ′
Typing Processes:
(CK-T-NIL)
Γ ` nil ` Γ ` nil
(CK-T-PAR)
Γ ` P1 ` Γ ′ ` P ′1 Γ ′ ` P2 ` Γ ′′ ` P ′2
Γ ` P1|P2 ` Γ ′′ ` P ′1|P ′2
(CK-T-REPL)
Γ ` P ` Γ ′ ` P ′
Γ ` ∗P ` Γ ′ ` ∗P ′
(CK-T-DATUM)
l ∈ r
Γ ` 〈[l ′]r 〉 l Γ ` 〈[l ′]r 〉
(CK-T-NEW)
Γ ` P ` Γ ′ ` P ′
Γ ` newloc(l).P ` Γ ′ ↗l ` newloc(l).P ′
(CK-T-IN)
Γ unionmulti {x : {`}} ` P ` Γ ′ unionmulti {x : r} ` P ′
Γ ` in(!x)@`′.P ` Γ ′↗x ` in([!x]r−{x})@`′.P ′
(CK-T-MATCH)
Γ ` P ` Γ ′ ` P ′
Γ ` in(`′′)@`′.P ` Γ ′ ` in(`′′)@`′.P ′
(CK-T-OUT)
{`, `′} ⊆ r Γ ` P ` Γ ′ ` P ′
Γ ` out([`′′]r )@`′.P ` Γ ′ + {x : r}x∈ FV(`′′) ` out([`′′]r )@`′.P ′
(CK-T-EVAL)
` ∈ reg(P1) Γ ` P1 `′ Γ ′ ` P ′1 Γ ′ ` P2 ` Γ ′′ ` P ′2
Γ ` eval(P1)@`′.P2 ` Γ ′′ + {x : {`′}}x∈ FV(P1) ` eval(P ′1)@`′.P ′2
An anomaly somehow related to (?) is
l :: in(!x)@l ′.newloc(l ′′).out([x]{l,l ′′})@l (Ď)
that would result in the annotated process
l :: in([!x]{l,l ′′})@l ′.newloc(l ′′).out([x]{l,l ′′})@l
Here the problem is that the l ′′ occurring in the annotation associated to !x by the inference system escapes from the
binder newloc that declares l ′′. Thus, these two occurrences of l ′′ are not the same! For the sake of simplicity, we
overcome this problem like before, i.e. by assigning > to the region annotation of !x .
To rule out anomalies like (?) and (Ď), in Table 2 we use function Γ↗`, that is inductively defined as
∅ ↗` , ∅
(Γ unionmulti {x : r})↗` ,
{
Γ↗` unionmulti {x : >} if ` ∈ r
Γ↗` unionmulti {x : r} otherwise
where unionmulti denotes union between environments with disjoint domains.
Function+ extends the information of an environment through another environment and is undefined if the domain
of the second environment is not included in that of the first one; formally
Γ + ∅ , Γ
Γ + {x : r} , Γ ′ unionmulti {x : r ∪ r ′} if Γ = Γ ′ unionmulti {x : r ′}
Γ + ({x : r} unionmulti Γ ′) , (Γ + {x : r})+ Γ ′
Finally, we write {. . .}i∈I to mean⋃i∈I {. . .}.
R. De Nicola et al. / Science of Computer Programming 63 (2006) 57–87 63
Before concluding this section, we briefly comment on some typing rules. Notice that the typing of N also verifies
that N is closed. Moreover, it can be easily seen that typing P1|P2 and P2|P1 yields the same typing; this relies on
commutativity of sets union, since Γ grows up by union of regions. In rule (CK-T-NEW), the resulting environment is
Γ ′↗l to rule out anomalies like (Ď). In rule (CK-T-IN), the procedure should type P in the environment Γ extended
by associating x to region {`}. At the end of this typing phase, the region annotation r calculated for x is associated to
the parameter !x . Notice that x can occur in x’s region r , generating anomalies like (??); to avoid this, the annotation
for x must be r −{x}. Moreover, it is possible that x occurs in region annotations within Γ ′ because of anomalies like
(?); thus, the environment resulting from this phase must be Γ ′↗x . In rule (CK-T-OUT), the type checker verifies
that `′′ can stay both in the hosting locality ` and in the target locality `′. The continuation process P is typed in
the environment Γ , thus obtaining the annotated process P ′ and the environment Γ ′. Hence, the result of the typing
will be out([`′′]r )@`′.P ′ together with Γ ′ extended with the information that the variables occurring in `′′ (i.e. x if
`′′ = x) could be seen at r . Similar observations also hold for rule (CK-T-EVAL) too; in particular, the check that the
process can cross the locality where it is hosted is performed whenever the process is going to migrate. To this aim,
we exploit the auxiliary function reg( ) that returns the intersection of the data regions occurring in its argument. Its
formal definition is
reg(nil) , > reg(newloc(l).P) , reg(P)− {l}
reg(out([`′]r )@`.P) , r ∩ reg(P) reg(in(T )@`.P)= reg(∗P) , reg(P)
reg(P1|P2) = reg(eval(P1)@`.P2) , reg(P1) ∩ reg(P2)
We deem well-typed those nets that successfully passed a typing phase.
Definition 1 (Well-Typed CKLAIM Nets). A net N is well-typed if there exists a net N ′ (written according to the
syntax of Table 1) such that N ′  N .
3.2. CKLAIM Typed operational semantics
CKLAIM nets are executed according to the reduction relation −→ defined in Table 3. −→ relates configurations
of the form L F N , where L is such that loc(N ) ⊆ L ⊂fin L and function loc(N ) returns the set of localities occurring
in N . In a configuration L F N , L is needed to ensure global freshness of new addresses. For the sake of readability,
when a reduction does not generate any fresh addresses, we write N −→ N ′ instead of L F N −→ L F N ′. We
denote with L unionmulti L ′ the disjoint union of sets L and L ′, and with −→∗ the reflexive and transitive closure of −→.
The semantics exploits substitutions, replacing variables with locality names; the substitution mapping x to l will
be written as {l/x}. The application of {l/x} to any syntactic term (variable/region/process/type environment) t , denoted
by t{l/x}, replaces each free occurrence of x in t with l, with renaming of bound variables possibly involved to avoid
captures. We remark that the application of a substitution to a process P also acts on the region annotations in P .
The reduction relation relies on a structural congruence relation, ≡, equating α-convertible processes, stating that
“‖” is commutative and associative, and that nil acts as the identity for “|”.
We now comment on the semantics rules. Rules (CK-OUT) and (CK-EVAL) say that a datum/process can be put at
the target of the out/eval only if such a node accepts the datum/process (i.e. l ∈ r ′d and l ∈ r ′p). This is necessary to
prevent an untrusted node l to send data/code to l ′. Notice that no static check could enforce this property without loss
of expressivity: e.g., in in(!x)@l.eval(. . .)@x , it is statically impossible to know which locality will replace x without
limiting the possible exchanges at l. Thus, it cannot be determined if the locality executing the eval is trusted by the
target locality or not. Rule (CK-IN) says that a process can retrieve a datum only if the continuation process respects
the datum annotation (i.e. r ′ ⊆ r ). If a datum is present in the target of the action for which this check succeeds, then
the datum is retrieved and replaces the input variable in the continuation; otherwise, the process is suspended until
such a datum is available (if ever). Rule (CK-MATCH) verifies if a datum l ′′ is present in l ′. If this is the case, the datum
is removed and the continuation proceeds; otherwise, the process is suspended. Notice that, in order to complete this
task, the node executing the action must be authorised by the region r . In rule (CK-NEW) the set L of localities already
in use is exploited to choose a fresh address l ′ for naming the new node. Moreover, we assume that a node l trusts
every node l ′ it creates. This is reasonable since, once created, l ′ is not known to any other node in the net; thus, l can
use it as a private resource and can decide the nodes of the net that can know it (by also exploiting region annotations).
For the sake of simplicity, l ′ is assigned the trust regions of l. However, it would be easy to extend the language for
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Table 3
CKLAIM operational semantics
(CK-OUT)
l ∈ r ′d
l rd :: rp out([l ′′]r )@l ′.P ‖ l ′ r ′d :: r ′p P
′ −→ l rd :: rp P ‖ l ′ r ′d :: r ′p P
′ | 〈[l ′′]r 〉
(CK-EVAL)
l ∈ r ′p
l rd :: rp eval(Q)@l ′.P ‖ l ′ r ′d :: r ′p P
′ −→ l rd :: rp P ‖ l ′ r ′d :: r ′p P
′ | Q
(CK-IN)
r ′ ⊆ r
l rd :: rp in([!x]r
′
)@l ′.P ‖ l ′ r ′d :: r ′p 〈[l
′′]r 〉 −→ l rd :: rp P{l
′′
/x} ‖ l ′ r ′d :: r ′p nil
(CK-MATCH)
l ∈ r
l rd :: rp in(l ′′)@l ′.P ‖ l ′ r ′d :: r ′p 〈[l
′′]r 〉 −→ l rd :: rp P ‖ l ′ r ′d :: r ′p nil
(CK-NEW)
L F l rd :: rp newloc(l ′).P −→ L unionmulti {l ′} F l rd∪{l′}:: rp∪{l′}P ‖ l ′ rd∪{l′}:: rp∪{l′} nil
(CK-CALL)
l rd :: rp ∗P −→ l rd :: rp ∗P | P
(CK-SPLIT)
L F l rd :: rp P1 ‖ l rd :: rp P2 ‖ N −→ L ′ F l r ′d :: r ′p P
′
1 ‖ l rd :: rp P ′2 ‖ N ′
L F l rd :: rp P1 | P2 ‖ N −→ L ′ F l r ′d :: r ′p P
′
1 | P ′2 ‖ N ′
(CK-PAR)
L F N1 −→ L ′ F N ′1
L F N1 ‖ N2 −→ L ′ F N ′1 ‖ N2
(CK-STRUCT)
N1 ≡ N ′1 L F N ′1 −→ L ′ F N ′2 N ′2 ≡ N2
L F N1 −→ L ′ F N2
allowing the programmer to explicitly specify the trust regions of a newly created node. Rule (CK-CALL) unfolds
a replicated process and corresponds to a procedure call. Rule (CK-SPLIT) permits splitting the parallel processes
running at a node thus enabling the application of the main reduction rules that, in fact, can be used when there is
only one thread running at l. Technically, a parallel between processes is transformed into a parallel between nodes.
Rules (CK-PAR) and (CK-STRUCT) are standard: the former says that, if part of a composed net evolves, the whole
net evolves accordingly and the latter says that structural congruent nets have the same reductions.
We now give two simple properties of the operational semantics. The first one describes the relationship between
the set of localities L in a configuration L F N and the localities occurring in the net obtained after a reduction step.
The second one describes the way parallel components located at node l could have been arrived there: they could
have been either allocated at l in the initial setting or placed at l by authorised nodes as the result of subsequent
computations.
Proposition 1. If L F N −→ L ′ F N ′ and loc(N ) ⊆ L, then loc(N ′) ⊆ L ′.
Proof. It is easy to prove that, if L F N −→ L ′ F N ′ then L ⊆ L ′ and loc(N ′) − loc(N ) = L ′ − L . Hence, we get
loc(N ′) = (loc(N ′)− loc(N )) ∪ (loc(N ′) ∩ loc(N )) ⊆ (L ′ − L) ∪ loc(N ) ⊆ (L ′ − L) ∪ L ′ = L ′. 
Proposition 2. Let L F N −→ L ′ F N ′, l 6∈ L ′ − L and l rd :: rp P be a node of N ′. Then, for any parallel component
P ′ in P it holds that: (i) either P ′ was located at l in the initial configuration N, or (ii) P ′ is a datum written at l by
a node in rd , or (iii) P ′ is a process spawned to l by a node in rp.
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Proof. By a straightforward induction on the length of inference for LFN −→ L ′FN ′ and by exploiting the premises
of rules (CK-OUT) and (CK-EVAL). 
To conclude this section, we implement in CKLAIM the example presented in Section 2. In this setting, the
addresses are lC and lS with region annotations such that lS ∈ rCd and lC ∈ r Sd (usually, r Sd = >), while rCp = r Sp = ∅.
Processes PC and PS become
PC , out(lC , [cc info]{lC ,lS})@lS .in(!y)@lC . < modify password y and access the service >
PS , ∗in(!x1, !x2)@lS . < check credit card info x2 > . newloc(p).out([p]{x1,lS})@x1.
< handle pwd modifications and provide the service >
By reasonably assuming that the password modification is carried on by only involving lC and lS , the inference system
annotates PC as follows:
P ′C , out(lC , [cc info]{lC ,lS})@lS .in([!y]{lC ,lS})@lC . · · ·
Similarly, if we assume that credit card checking is performed locally by the server and never used anymore, PS is
annotated as:
P ′S , ∗in(!x1, [!x2]{lS})@lS . · · · .newloc(p).out([p]{x1,lS})@x1. · · ·
Now, the dynamic checks of rule (CK-IN) are respected; thus, the resulting net can evolve as expected:
lC rCd
:: rCp P ′C ‖ lS r Sd :: r Sp P
′
S
−→∗ lC rCd :: rCp in([!y]
{lC ,lS})@lC . · · · ‖
lS r Sd
:: r Sp P ′S | < check cc info > .newloc(p).out([p]{lC ,lS})@lC . · · ·
−→∗ lC rCd :: rCp < modify password p and access the service > ‖
lS r Sd
:: r Sp P ′S | < handle pwd modifications and provide the service >
Notice that, in the reductions above, we omitted the sets L of localities in use: they can be easily inferred. Moreover,
as usual, we used −→∗ to denote the reflexive and transitive closure of −→.
3.3. Type soundness
Our main results state that well-typedness is preserved along reductions and that well-typed nets do respect
region annotations. The former result is called subject reduction; the latter result is called type safety and states
that well-typedness guarantees that there are no immediate violations of data regions. Together, these results imply
the soundness of our theory, i.e. no violation of data regions will ever occur during the evolution of well-typed nets.
We start by proving two standard technical results for a type system. The first one states that structural congruence
preserves well-typedness and its proof is standard. The second one freely permits to discharge some entries from a
typing environment by replacing them with localities in all terms involved.
Lemma 1 (Subject Congruence). If N is well-typed and N ≡ N ′ then N ′ is well-typed.
Lemma 2 (Substitutivity). If Γ unionmulti {x : r} ` P ` Γ ′ unionmulti {x : r ′} ` P ′ and σ = {l/x}, then Γσ ` Pσ `σ
Γ ′σ ` P ′σ .
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the length of the inference used to derive the typing judgement. The base
case is when only rules (CK-T-NIL) and (CK-T-DATUM) are used: in both cases it is trivial to conclude. Let us
consider the inductive case and reason by case analysis on the last rule used to infer the judgement. We explicitly
show the most significant cases; the remaining ones are easier.
(CK-T-IN): By definition, P = in(!y)@`′.Q and P ′ = in([!y]r ′′−{y})@`′.Q′, where Γ unionmulti{x : r}unionmulti{y : {`}} ` Q `
Γ ′′unionmulti{x : r ′′′}unionmulti{y : r ′′} ` Q′. By hypothesis, y 6= x ; thus, by induction, Γσunionmulti{y : {`σ }} ` Qσ `σ Γ ′′σunionmulti
{y : r ′′σ } ` Q′σ . Moreover, Γ ′ = Γ ′′↗y and thus Γ ′σ = (Γ ′′↗y)σ = (Γ ′′σ)↗y . Hence, by using rule
(CK-T-IN), we can conclude the wanted Γσ ` in(!y)@`′σ.Qσ `σ Γ ′σ ` in([!y]r ′′σ−{y})@`′σ.Q′σ.
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(CK-T-OUT): By definition, P = out([`1]r1)@`2.Q and P ′ = out([`1]r1)@`2.Q′, where {`1, `2} ⊆ r1 and
Γ unionmulti {x : r} ` Q ` Γ ′′ unionmulti {x : r2} ` Q′ . Trivially, {`1σ, `2σ } ⊆ r1σ and, by induction,
Γσ ` Qσ `σ Γ ′′σ ` Q′σ. We now distinguish three cases:
(1) `1 ∈ L . In this case Γ ′ = Γ ′′ and r ′ = r2; thus, Γ ′σ = Γ ′′σ . By using rule (CK-T-OUT), we can
conclude the wanted Γσ ` out([`1σ ]r1σ )@`2σ.Qσ `σ Γ ′σ ` out([`1σ ]r1σ )@`2σ.Q′σ.
(2) `1 = x . Now r ′ = r2 ∪ r1 but Γ ′ = Γ ′′; this suffices to conclude like in the previous case.
(3) `1 = y 6= x . In this case r ′ = r2 and Γ ′ = Γ ′′ + {y : r1}; thus, Γ ′σ = Γ ′′σ + {y : r1σ } is defined. We
can then conclude like before. 
Theorem 1 (Subject Reduction). If N is well-typed and L F N −→ L ′ F N ′ then N ′ is well-typed.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the length of the inference of L F N −→ L ′ F N ′. Notice that the sets
of localities L and L ′ do not play any role (namely, they do not affect the definition of well-typed net) and will be
ignored in the rest of the proof.
Base step: We reason by case analysis on the axioms (i.e. the first six rules) of Table 3.
(CK-OUT). By hypothesis, N = l rd :: rp out([l ′′]r )@l ′.P ‖ l ′ r ′d :: r ′p P ′ and there exists a net M such that M  N .
By definition, M = l rd :: rp out([l ′′]r )@l ′.Q ‖ l ′ r ′d :: r ′p Q′ where ∅ ` out([l ′′]r )@l ′.Q l ∅ `
out([l ′′]r )@l ′.P and ∅ ` Q′ l ′ ∅ ` P ′. By the premises of rule (CK-T-OUT), ∅ ` Q l ∅ ` P and
l ′ ∈ r . This suffices to conclude that N ′ = l rd :: rp P ‖ l ′ r ′d :: r ′p P ′ | 〈[l ′′]r 〉 is well-typed.
(CK-EVAL). This case is similar. Indeed, by the premise of rule (CK-T-EVAL), it holds that there exists a process Q′
such that ∅ ` Q′ l ′ ∅ ` Q.
(CK-IN). By hypothesis, N results from the typing of a net M = l rd :: rp in(!x)@l ′.Q ‖ l ′ r ′d :: r ′p 〈[l ′′]r 〉. The
main thing to prove is that the well-typedness of l rd :: rp in([!x]r ′)@l ′.P implies the well-typedness of
l rd :: rp P{l ′′/x}. By the premise of rule (CK-T-IN), it holds that {x : {l}} ` Q l {x : r ′′} ` P for
r ′ = r ′′ − {x}. Hence, by Lemma 2, ∅ ` Q{l ′′/x} l ∅ ` P{l ′′/x} . This suffices to conclude.
(CK-MATCH) and (CK-NEW). These cases are easy.
(CK-CALL). By hypothesis, there exists a process Q such that ∅ ` ∗ Q l ∅ ` ∗P . By the premise of rule
(CK-T-REPL), ∅ ` Q l ∅ ` P . Thus, by using rule (CK-T-PAR), we can conclude.
Inductive step: We reason by case analysis on the last applied inference rule of Table 3.
(CK-SPLIT). By hypothesis, we have that N = l rd :: rp P1|P2 ‖ N ′′ results from the typing of a net M = l rd :: rp
Q1|Q2 ‖ M ′′. In particular, ∅ ` Q1|Q2 l ∅ ` P1|P2 that, by rule (CK-T-PAR), implies that
∅ ` Q1 l Γ ` P1 and Γ ` Q2 l ∅ ` P2 . However, Γ must be ∅ as well; indeed, it can be easily
checked that Γ1 ` P ′ l Γ2 ` P ′′ implies dom(Γ1) = dom(Γ2). Hence, l rd :: rp P1 ‖ l rd :: rp P2 ‖ N ′′ is
well-typed and, by induction, l r ′d :: r ′p P ′1 ‖ l rd :: rp P ′2 ‖ N ′ is well-typed. This implies that l r ′d :: r ′p P ′1|P ′2 ‖ N ′
is well-typed, as required.
(CK-PAR) and (CK-STRUCT). By a straightforward induction; the latter case relies on Lemma 1. 
We now turn to type safety. As we have already said, it states that well-typedness guarantees absence of immediate
violations of data regions. However, the wanted safety property requires that data regions are respected along all
possible computations. To properly formalise this property we need to define a finer semantics. Indeed, deeming a
net to be safe when “for any node l rd :: rp P it holds that l occurs in the region of each datum in P” would not be
satisfactory because the regions annotating data disappear upon data withdrawal. Thus, it would become impossible to
formalise the requirement that the region specification associated to a datum when it is produced is respected during
all the datum lifetime (i.e. also after its retrieval). For example, consider the net N = l rd :: rp in([!x]r ′)@l ′.P ‖ l ′ r ′d :: r ′p
〈[l ′′]r 〉. Upon execution of action in, the net becomes N ′ = l rd :: rp P ′ ‖ l ′ r ′d :: r ′p nil, where P ′ = P{l
′′
/x}. Now, all
the occurrences of l ′′ in P ′ are not annotated anymore with region r . Hence, in N ′ we have no mean to formalise the
statement that l can use l ′′ by respecting the original annotation r .
In other terms, with the calculus introduced in Table 1, we cannot express absence of data regions violations
syntactically, because in general we lack information about the region that originally annotated data carried by
R. De Nicola et al. / Science of Computer Programming 63 (2006) 57–87 67
Table 4
Tagged typing rules
pid(`) ∈ reg(`′) ∩ reg(`′′) Γ ` P ` Γ ′ ` P ′
Γ ` in(`′′)@`′.P ` Γ ′ ` in(`′′)@`′.P ′
pid(`) ∈ reg(`′) Γ unionmulti {x : {pid(`)}} ` P ` Γ ′ unionmulti {x : r} ` P ′
Γ ` in(!x)@`′.P ` Γ ′↗x ` in([!x]r−{x})@`′.P ′
pid(`) ∈ reg(`′) {pid(`), pid(`′)} ⊆ r Γ ` P ` Γ ′ ` P ′
Γ ` out([x]r )@`′.P ` Γ ′ + {x : r} ` out([x]r )@`′.P ′
pid(`) ∈ reg(`′) {pid(`), pid(`′)} ⊆ r2 ⊆ r1 Γ ` P ` Γ ′ ` P ′
Γ ` out([[l]r1 ]r2 )@`′.P ` Γ ′ ` out([[l]r1 ]r2 )@`′.P ′
pid(`) ∈ reg(`′) ∩ reg(P1) Γ ` P1 `′ Γ ′ ` P ′1 Γ ′ ` P2 ` Γ ′′ ` P ′2
Γ ` eval(P1)@`′.P2 ` Γ ′′ + {x : {pid(`′)}}x∈ FV(P1) ` eval(P ′1)@`′.P ′2
processes. To overcome this problem, we design a tagged language, where each occurrence of a locality in a process
is tagged with a region determining its visibility. To this aim, we slightly adapt the syntax of CKLAIM, by letting
identifiers to be
` ::= [l]r | x
We can now formalise when a net is safe. To this aim, we extend function reg defined in Section 3.1 by taking into
account also the locality tags when calculating the region intersection. For example, reg(out([[l]r1 ]r2)@[l ′]r3 .P) =
r1 ∩ r2 ∩ r3 ∩ reg(P). Moreover, we let reg(〈[l]r 〉) = r .
Definition 2 (Safety). A net N is safe if for any l rd :: rp P in N , it holds that l ∈ reg(P).
The tagged semantics generalises that in Table 3. Indeed, processes like out([[l]r1 ]r2)@[l ′]r3 or in([l]r1)@[l ′]r2
can evolve. These terms may arise upon application of substitutions that now map variables into localities tagged with
regions. We let the application of the substitution to a region to replace variables only with localities (hence omitting
their tags) thus ensuring that regions are still sets of identifies. The reduction relation, however, ignores the tags and
considers tagged names as plain ones. This should have been somehow expected because, as we said before, the only
role of tags is to enable formalising and checking that a net is safe. Thus, rules (CK-OUT) and (CK-IN) now become
l ∈ r ′d
l rd :: rp out([[l ′′]r1 ]r2)@[l ′]r3 .P ‖ l ′ r ′d :: r ′p P ′ −→ l rd :: rp P ‖ l ′ r ′d :: r ′p P ′ | 〈[l ′′]r2〉
r1 ⊆ r
l rd :: rp in([!x]r1)@[l ′]r2 .P ‖ l ′ r ′d :: r ′p 〈[l ′′]r 〉 −→ l rd :: rp P{[l
′′]r/x} ‖ l ′ r ′d :: r ′p nil
To avoid confusion, we use the arrow −→ to relate tagged terms. The other rules extend those in Table 3 in the
expected way.
The typing procedure for tagged terms is denoted by and its most significant rules are given in Table 4 (the other
ones are smooth adaptations of those in Table 2). We use functions pid(`) and reg(`) to denote, respectively, the plain
identifier and the region of the tagged identifier `. The intuition underlying  is that, whenever an identifier occurs at
a locality, the locality must be included in the region tagging the identifier.
Given a plain net N , we use tag(N ) to denote the set containing all the well-typed (w.r.t.) tagged nets obtained by
tagging localities in N . Given a tagged net N , we denote with untag(N ) the plain net obtained from N by removing all
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the locality tags. Notice that tag(N ) is not empty because it contains at least the net obtained by tagging each locality
in N with >. We call the latter net the outset tagging of N .
Predictably, the tagged language and the original one are strongly related. Moreover, the typing of tagged terms is
preserved along (tagged) reductions. The following results formalises these properties.
Proposition 3.
(1) If N  M then untag(N )  untag(M).
(2) If N  M, then for all M ′ ∈ tag(M) there exists N ′ ∈ tag(N ) such that N ′  M ′.
(3) If L F N −→ L ′ F N ′ then L F untag(N ) −→ L ′ F untag(N ′).
Proof. All properties easily follow from definitions of  and −→ . 
Corollary 1 (Tagged Subject Reduction). If N is a well-typed tagged net and L F N −→ L ′ F N ′ then N ′ is a well-
typed tagged net.
Proof. By Proposition 3(1) and (3), it holds that untag(N ) is well-typed and that L F untag(N ) −→ L ′ F untag(N ′).
Because of Theorem 1, this implies that untag(N ′) is well-typed and, by Proposition 3(2), we can conclude. 
We are now ready to prove the type safety theorem.
Theorem 2 (Type Safety). If N is a well-typed tagged net then N is safe.
Proof. By definition, N is a well-typed (tagged) net if there exists a net M such that M  N . The proof proceeds
by induction on the length of the inference leading to this judgement and heavily relies on checking the premise
pid(`) ∈ reg(`′) contained in each rule of Table 4. 
Corollary 2 (Type Soundness). Let N be a (plain) well-typed net and N ′ be its outset tagging. Then LF N ′ −→ ∗ L ′F
N ′′ implies that N ′′ is safe.
Proof. By Proposition 3(2) and by the fact that N ′ ∈ tag(N ), it holds that N ′ is a well-typed tagged net. We now
proceed by induction on the length of −→ ∗. The base case is Theorem 2; the inductive case trivially follows by
exploiting Corollary 1. 
The results given above can be generalised by requiring only a subnet of the whole net to be well-typed. By using
the convention that absence of a region annotation means >, a not well-typed net can be executed according to the
(tagged versions of) rules in Table 3 by safely considering all its variable annotations as >. We call the r-subnet of N
the net formed by all the nodes l rd :: rp P in N such that {l} ∪ rd ∪ rp ⊆ r . Notice that such a net is not necessarily
defined for all r ; of course it is always defined for r = > and coincides with N (in this case Theorem 3 coincides with
Corollary 2).
Theorem 3 (Localised Type Soundness). Let N be a plain net and N ′ be its outset tagging. If the r-subnet of N ′
is defined and well-typed, and if L F N ′ −→ ∗ L ′ F N ′′, then the r ′-subnet of N ′′ is defined and safe, where
r ′ = r ∪ (L ′ − L).
Proof. By exploiting Theorem 2, we only need to show that the r ′-subnet of N ′′ is defined and well-typed. We just
consider the case for L F N ′ −→ L ′ F N ′′; the more general case is recovered by using an inductive argument similar
to that in Corollary 2. The proof proceeds like that of Theorem 1. Just notice that, when the operational rule used to
infer the reduction is (the tagged version of) (CK-OUT) or (CK-EVAL) resp., the premise l ∈ r ′d or l ∈ r ′p respectively
turns out to be crucial to maintain well-typedness. Moreover, the only non-trivial case for establishing if the r ′-subnet
is defined, is when the operational rule used is (CK-NEW). In this case, the claim is easily proved since the new node
is assigned the regions of the creating one. 
To conclude, we want to remark that the language can be easily extended to enable explicit specification of the
regions of the new nodes. In this case, existence of the r ′-subnet could be ensured by adding a premise to rule
(CK-NEW) requiring that the regions of the new nodes are included in those of the creating node.
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Table 5
Dpi syntax
l, h, k, . . . ∈ L LOCALITY NAMES
a, b, c, . . . ∈ C CHANNEL NAMES
x, y, z, . . . VARIABLES
e ::= l | a NAMES
u ::= e | x IDENTIFIERS
X ::= x | z@y INPUT PARAMETERS
W ::= u | v@u MESSAGES
N ::= lrprd [[P]] | N1 ‖ N2 NETS
P ::= PROCESSES
stop (empty)
| α.P (prefixing)
| P1 | P2 (parallel composition)
| (νe)P (restriction)
| ∗P (replication)
α ::= ACTIONS
u!〈[W ]r 〉 (send)
| u?(X) (receive)
| go u (migrate)
4. Dpi : Distributed pi -calculus
We now apply our approach to Dpi [19], a variant of the pi -calculus [23] with process distribution and mobility.
The syntax of Dpi is given in Table 5. There are two categories of names: locality names L , ranged over by l, and
channel names C , ranged over by a. The symbol e is used for channel or locality names, while u, v, called identifiers,
denote names and variables (ranged over by x). The exchanged messages, ranged over by W , can be both identifiers
and compound identifiers of the form v@u (where u is expected to be a locality name or variable, while v is expected
to be a channel name or variable). Similarly, input parameters, generically referred to as X , can either be a simple
variable x or a compound variable z@y (y is a locality variable and z is a channel variable). Dpi nodes (located
threads, in the original terminology) will be written as l
rp
rd [[P]]. Communication is local, synchronous and channel
based. Process actions are:
• u!〈[W ]r 〉: makes available message W (with associated region r ) along the channel u of the locality where the
action is fired.
• u?(X): retrieves a messageW from the channel u of the locality where the action is fired and replaces the parameter
X with the message in the continuation process. If X is a variable x , the message retrieved must be a name e.
Otherwise, if X is z@y, then the message must be of the form a@l, and z will be replaced by a and y will be
replaced by l.
• go u: spawns the continuation process for execution at the node referred to by u.
Identifiers occurring in process terms can be bound; more precisely, prefix u?(X).P binds the variables in X (i.e.
it binds x if X = x and binds both y and z if X = z@y), while (νe)P binds name e; in both cases, P is the scope of
the binding. The set of free variables FV( ), α-conversion and closed nets are defined accordingly.
To conclude the presentation, we want to argue for the need to associate two regions to each Dpi node. Indeed,
differently from CKLAIM, no remote operation is allowed (a part, of course, process spawning), hence the data region
could seem useless. However, using only the process region would be too restrictive: in fact, if a node l does not know
or trust another node k, then k has no mean to come into contact with l. Our solution permits to distinguish generic
processes from processes that are not very risky because, for example, they only perform an output and then terminate.
These last processes are of the form u!〈W 〉.stop and we deem them output processes. However, processes of different
form could be accepted as well: e.g. process u!〈W 〉.v!〈W ′〉.stop is as risky as u!〈W 〉.stop. Since we do not want to
take a definite standing on the set of output processes, we use a predicate output(P), that holds true if and only if P
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is an output process, but leave aside its exact definition. Thus, output processes coming from k are accepted by node
l
rp
rd [[·]] only if k ∈ rd ; all the other processes are accepted if k ∈ rp (see rule (D-T-GO) in Table 6).
4.1. Typing Dpi nets
The typing system for CKLAIM of Table 2 could be straightforwardly adapted to deal with Dpi nets; see Remark 1
in Section 4.2. However, in a channel-based setting region compatibility checks can be statically performed (on the
contrary, they are dynamically performed in CKLAIM — see rule (CK-IN)) because it is natural to associate each
channel with a region annotation describing the region of the data exchangeable along it. Thus, if a channel a can
carry data visible within r , then messages with region r1 ⊇ r can be sent along a and input parameters with region
r2 ⊆ r can be used to retrieve data from a. By transitivity, we get r2 ⊆ r1 thus ensuring that the use of the data
respects the specifications of the data region. Hence, in this setting, parameters do not need to be annotated because
the correct use of the data can be statically enforced by the typing system.
To properly deal with name passing, we take advantage of some of the theory from [19]. The resulting type system
is very different from that in Table 2 but shows how our approach can be adapted to different languages. We assume
the following types:
TYPES: τ ::= φ | γ | γ@φ
LOCALITY TYPES: φ ::= r F r ′[u˜ : γ ]rprd
CHANNEL TYPES: γ ::= r(τ )
Intuitively, if v has type r(τ ) then it is a channel that can be seen by nodes in r and can carry messages of type τ .
Similarly, if v has type r F r ′[u˜ : γ ]rprd then it is a locality whose name can be one of the names in r ′ (this is useful
only when v is a variable; if v is a name, then r ′ = {v}, see requirement (Ě) below), that can be seen by nodes in r ,
accepts data/code from nodes in rd/rp resp., and hosts channels u˜, in an orderly way of types γ˜ . As usual,˜ denotes
a (possibly empty) set of entities . Finally, γ@φ, with φ = r F r ′[u˜ : γ ]rprd , can be assigned to a message u@v where
u is a channel of type γ and v is a locality of type r F r ′[u˜ : γ , u : γ ]rprd .
For a type τ , we let reg(τ ) to denote the region that can see values of type τ , i.e. reg(r(τ )) = reg(rFr ′[u˜ : γ ]rprd ) , r .
Similarly, for a locality type φ = r F r ′[u˜ : γ ]rprd , we let val(φ), dreg(φ) and preg(φ) to denote, resp., regions r ′, rd
and rp.
The typing system for Dpi nets is given in Table 6. The main judgement is Γ ` N , stating that N is well-
typed in the environment Γ . A type environment is a finite partial function mapping locality names and variables
to locality types. Therefore, since locality types contain information about the allocated channels, it is also possible
to extract from a typing environment the channel types associated to channel names and variables. In particular, if
Γ (u) = r F r ′[v : γ, v˜′ : γ ′]rprd , we shall write Γ (u)(v) = γ . We shall only consider typing environments satisfying
the following constraint:
Let Γ (v) = r F r ′[u˜ : γ ]rprd . If v ∈ L then r ′ = {v}; otherwise, for
each l ∈ r ′, it must be that r ⊆ reg(Γ (l)) and rd ⊆ dreg(Γ (l)) (Ě)
and rp ⊆ preg(Γ (l)).
This condition states that the component r ′ is really useful only when v is a variable; in this case, it collects the possible
names v can assume at runtime. Moreover, it states that regions r /rd /rp must respect the corresponding specifications
contained in Γ for all the values v can assume.
We assume that Γ ` N holds true only if Γ satisfies (Ě), Γ does not contain variables and FV(N ) = ∅. The
main judgement relies on two auxiliary judgements for typing processes and messages. Judgement Γ `u P states
that P can be properly executed at u while respecting Γ ; we always assume that FV(P) ⊆ dom(Γ ). Judgement
Γ `u W : τ states that message W can be assigned type τ at u under the assumptions Γ . Some aspects, like the
extension of an environment with a new item (written Γ , uW : τ ) and the subtyping relation (written τ v τ ′), have
been straightforwardly adapted from [19] and are given in Table 7. We omit comments on these features and refer the
interested reader to [19].
We now briefly comment on some of the typing rules. In rule (D-T-LRES), we assume that the created node is
assigned the regions of the creating one (this is similar to CKLAIM — see rule (CK-NEW)). In rule (D-T-IN), it is
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Table 6
Type checking for Dpi
Typing Nets:
(D-T-NET)
Γ ` N1 Γ ` N2
Γ ` N1 ‖ N2
(D-T-NODE)
Γ (l) = r F r ′[a˜ : γ ]rprd Γ `l P
Γ ` lrprd [[P]]
Typing Processes:
(D-T-NIL)
Γ `u stop
(D-T-REPL)
Γ `u P
Γ `u ∗P
(D-T-PAR)
Γ `u P1 Γ `u P2
Γ `u P1|P2
(D-T-CRES)
Γ , ua : γ `u P
Γ `u (νa)P
(D-T-IN)
Γ `u v : r(τ ) val(Γ (u)) ⊆ r Γ , u X : τ `u P
Γ `u v?(X).P
(D-T-LRES)
Γ , u l : > F {l}[∅]preg(Γ (u))∪{l}dreg(Γ (u))∪{l} `u P
Γ `u (νl)P
(D-T-OUT)
Γ `u v : r ′(τ ) val(Γ (u)) ⊆ r ′ Γ `u W : τ ′ τ v τ ′
u ∈ r ⋃w∈r val(Γ (w)) ⊆ reg(τ ) Γ `u P
Γ `u v!〈[W ]r 〉.P
(D-T-GO)
val(Γ (u)) ⊆ reguΓ (go v.P)
if output(P) then val(Γ (u)) ⊆ dreg(Γ (v))
else val(Γ (u)) ⊆ preg(Γ (v)) Γ `v P
Γ `u go v.P
Typing Messages:
(D-T-CHAN)
Γ (u)(v) = γ
Γ `u v : γ
(D-T-LOC)
Γ (v) = φ
Γ `u v : φ
(D-T-COMPOUND)
Γ (w) = r F r ′[v˜′ : γ ′, v : γ ]rprd
Γ `u v@w : γ@r F r ′[v˜′ : γ ′]rprd
checked that u can access channel v (the fact that v is a channel is ensured by the fact that Γ indirectly assigns v a
channel type through the type of the locality where v is placed) and that the continuation properly uses the received
message (i.e. P is typeable in an environment obtained by extending Γ with the information that X has type at most
τ , the type of the value carried by v). Similarly, in rule (D-T-OUT), it is checked that u can access channel v, that
message W can be assigned at least type τ in u by Γ , that u can see W and that the region specified for W is at
most the region of the values that v can carry. Finally, rule (D-T-GO) verifies that u can see v and all the identifiers
occurring in P by exploiting function reguΓ (·) defined inductively as follows:
reguΓ (stop) , > reguΓ (∗P) , reguΓ (P) reguΓ (P1|P2) , reguΓ (P1) ∩ reguΓ (P2)
reguΓ ((νe)P),reg
u
Γ (P)−{e} reguΓ (go v.P) , reg(Γ (v)) ∩ regvΓ (P)
reguΓ (v!〈[W ]r 〉.P), reg(Γ (u)(v)) ∩ r ∩ reguΓ (P)
reguΓ (v?(X).P) , reg(Γ (u)(v)) ∩ reguΓ (P)
The premises of the rule also check if u can send P to v (by exploiting the data/process region of v according to the
fact that P is an output process or not) and if P type checks at v.
To conclude, we define well-typed Dpi nets.
Definition 3 (Well-typed Dpi Nets). A net N is well-typed in Γ if Γ ` N . A net N is well-typed if there exists a
typing environment Γ such that N is well-typed in Γ .
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Table 7
Technicalities of Dpi typing
Environment Extension :
Γ , uw : φ , Γ ′ s.t. Γ ′(v) =
{
Γ (v) if v 6= w and w 6∈ dom(Γ )
φ if v = w 6∈ dom(Γ )
Γ , uw : γ , Γ ′ s.t. Γ ′(v) =
{
Γ (v) if v 6= u
r F r ′[w : γ, w˜′ : γ ′]rprd if v = u and w 6∈ w˜′ and Γ (u) = r F r ′[w˜′ : γ ′]
rp
rd
Γ , u x1@x2 : γ@φ , Γ ′ s.t. Γ ′(v) =
{
Γ (v) if v 6= x2 and x2 6∈ dom(Γ )
r F r ′[x1 : γ, u˜ : γ ]rprd if v = x2 6∈ dom(Γ ) and φ = r F r ′[u˜ : γ ]
rp
rd
Subtyping Relation :
τ v τ
τ v τ ′ τ ′ v τ
τ = τ ′
τ1 v τ2 τ2 v τ3
τ1 v τ3
r ⊆ s r ′ ⊇ s′ rd ⊆ sd rp ⊆ sp n ≤ m ∀i = 1, · · · , n.γi v γ ′i
r F r ′[u1 : γ1, . . . , un : γn ]rprd v s F s′[u1 : γ ′1, . . . , um : γ ′m ]
sp
sd
r ⊆ r ′ τ v τ ′
r(τ ) v r ′(τ ′)
γ v γ ′ φ v φ′
γ@φ v γ ′@φ′
Table 8
Dpi operational semantics
(Dpi -COMM)
l
rp
rd [[a?(X).P | a!〈[W ]r 〉.Q]] 7−→ l
rp
rd [[P{W/X } | Q]]
(Dpi -CALL)
l
rp
rd [[∗P]] 7−→ l
rp
rd [[∗P | P]]
(Dpi -GO)
l
rp
rd [[go k.P]] ‖ k
r ′p
r ′d
[[Q]] 7−→ lrprd [[stop]] ‖ k
r ′p
r ′d
[[P | Q]]
(Dpi -SPLIT)
K F lrprd [[P]] ‖ l
rp
rd [[Q]] ‖ N 7−→ K ′ F l
r ′p
r ′d
[[P ′]] ‖ lrprd [[Q′]] ‖ N ′
K F lrprd [[P | Q]] ‖ N 7−→ K ′ F l
r ′p
r ′d
[[P ′ | Q′]] ‖ N ′
(Dpi -NEWLOC)
K F lrprd [[(νk)P]] 7−→ K unionmulti {k} F l
rp∪{k}
rd∪{k} [[P]] ‖ k
rp∪{k}
rd∪{k} [[stop]]
(Dpi -PAR)
K F N1 7−→ K ′ F N ′1
K F N1 ‖ N2 7−→ K ′ F N ′1 ‖ N2
(Dpi -NEWCHAN)
K F lrprd [[(νa)P]] 7−→ K unionmulti {a@l} F l
rp
rd [[P]]
(Dpi -STRUCT)
N1 ≡ N ′1 K F N ′1 7−→ K ′ F N ′2 N ′2 ≡ N2
K F N1 7−→ K ′ F N ′2
4.2. Dpi operational semantics
Dpi nets evolve according to the reduction relation 7−→ defined in Table 8. Like in CKLAIM, 7−→
relates configurations of the form K F N , where K is a set of localities and localised channels (thus, K =
{l1, l2, . . . , a1@l1, a2@l2, . . .}) such that n(N ) ⊆ K ⊂fin L∪(C×L), and function n(N ) returns the set of all (possibly
compound) names occurring in N . For example, a suitable K for the net l
rp
rd [[a?(X).stop]] is {l, a@l} ∪ rp ∪ rd . Like
before, 7−→∗ denotes the reflexive and transitive closure of 7−→.
Substitutions are now generalised so that they map input parameters to messages and their application keeps into
account also the structure of the message/parameter involved. In particular, in P{W/X}, if W is a name e, then X must
be a variable x and the application replaces x with e in P; otherwise, if W is a compound message a@l, then X must
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be a compound variable z@y and the application replaces z with a and y with l in P . Like in CKLAIM, substitution
application also acts on the region annotations in P .
The reduction relation relies on a structural congruence relation, ≡, equating α-convertible processes, stating that
“‖” is commutative and associative, and that stop acts as the identity for “|”.
We now comment on the Dpi peculiar operational rules; the others are similar to the corresponding ones of
CKLAIM. Notice that, differently from CKLAIM, region annotations are not exploited to infer reductions, thanks
to the powerful static typing. Rule (Dpi -COMM) states that the producer and the consumer of a datum must locally
synchronise along a named channel a. Rule (Dpi -GO) moves the continuation process to the node target of the go ;
notice that the static typing has already verified that k accepts data/code from l (i.e. l ∈ r ′d or l ∈ r ′p, according to
the fact that P is an output process or not). Rules (Dpi -NEWLOC) and (Dpi -NEWCHAN) handle name restriction.
The first one creates a new node addressed by the fresh locality name k; k enlarges the creating node’s regions that,
similarly to CKLAIM, are assigned to the new node too. The second rule allocates a new channel in the current locality.
In both cases, the set K of names already in use is exploited to choose a fresh name. This corresponds to the intuition
that, rather than declaring something as local, one can give it a syntactically different name. The effect is the same
as in the standard semantics [19], where structural congruence is exploited to extend the scope of names by moving
name restriction to the outermost level.
Before concluding, let us implement in Dpi the example given in Section 2. Like in CKLAIM, the addresses are lC
and lS with region annotations such that lS ∈ rCd and lC ∈ r Sd (usually, r Sd = >), while rCp = r Sp = ∅. Processes PC
and PS now become
PC , (νpwd).(go lS .req!〈pwd@lC , [creditCard info]{lC ,lS}〉 |
pwd?(y). < modify password y and access the service >)
PS , ∗req?(x1@x ′1, x2). < check credit card info x2 > .
(νp)(go x ′1.x1!〈[p]{x ′1,lS}〉 |
< handle password modifications and provide the service >)
Channel req is used as the access point to the server for requiring the service, while pwd is a fresh channel used to
transmit secret passwords between the client and the server. For the sake of presentation, we also assume basic values
(of type val) for passwords and credit card information. Under these assumptions, a possible type environment to type
check the net
lC
rCp
rCd
[[PC ]] ‖ lSr
S
p
r Sd
[[PS]]
is
Γ : lC 7→ φC
lS 7→ > F {lS}[req : >(γpwd@φC × val)]r
S
p
r Sd
where φC = >F{lC }[ ]r
C
p
rCd
and γpwd = {lC , lS}(val). Clearly, we are not considering the activities of modifying/handling
passwords, nor those of accessing/providing the service. A sketch of the type checking for PC is given below. It
requires to establish that
Γ `lC (νpwd).(go lS .req!〈pwd@lC , [creditCard info]{lC ,lS}〉 | pwd?(y). · · ·)
By applying rules (D-T-LRES) and (D-T-PAR), this requires to infer that
Γ1 `lC go lS .req!〈pwd@lC , [creditCard info]{lC ,lS}〉
where Γ1 = Γ , lCpwd : γpwd. The judgement above can be inferred by using rule (D-T-GO). To this aim, first we
establish that {lC } ⊆ reglCΓ1(go lS .req!〈pwd@lC , [creditCard info]{lC ,lS}〉) = {lC , lS} and {lC } ⊆ r Sd , then we prove
that
Γ1 `lS req!〈pwd@lC , [creditCard info]{lC ,lS}〉
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This last judgement is inferred by using rule (D-T-OUT). Indeed, the following conditions are all satisfied:
Γ1 `lC req : >(γpwd@φC × val) {lS} ⊆ > Γ1 `lC pwd@lC : γpwd@φC
Γ1 `lC creditCard info : val Γ1 `lS stop
Remark 1 (Typing Dpi Nets a` la CKLAIM). The typing approach used for CKLAIM, where the values exchanged in
communications are checked at runtime, can be easily adapted to Dpi . The resulting type system is simpler, e.g. types
are simply regions and do not need complex subtyping relations. Of course, the modified setting requires more runtime
checks. The definition of well-typed nets, like the type inference phase, can be straightforwardly adapted from Table 2.
Clearly, the syntax of Table 5 must be adapted by letting parameters to be defined as
X ::= [x]r | [z]r1@[y]r2
As regards the operational semantics, we need to replace rules (Dpi -COMM) and (Dpi -GO) in Table 8 with the
following ones:
r ′ ⊆ r
l
rp
rd [[a?([x]r
′
).P | a!〈[e]r 〉.Q]] 7−→ lrprd [[P{e/x} | Q]]
r1 ∪ r2 ⊆ r
l
rp
rd [[a?([z]r1@[y]r2).P | a!〈[b@k]r 〉.Q]] 7−→ lrprd [[P{b@k/z@y} | Q]]
if output(P) then l ∈ r ′d else l ∈ r ′p
l
rp
rd [[go k.P]] ‖ k
r ′p
r ′d
[[Q]] 7−→ lrprd [[stop]] ‖ k
r ′p
r ′d
[[P | Q]]
4.3. Type soundness
We now prove subject reduction and type safety for the type system of Table 6. The type soundness will be an easy
corollary of these properties. We start with the corresponding versions for Dpi of Lemmas 1 and 2; then we state and
prove subject reduction and type safety. To this aim, we define Γ with K for N as the typing environment Γ extended
with the fresh names in K that can type N . Formally,
Γ with K for N ,
Γ if K = ∅(Γ with K ′ for N ), la : γ if K = K ′ unionmulti {a@l}
(Γ with K ′ for N ) unionmulti k : φ if K = K ′ unionmulti {k}
where we let unionmulti to denote both the disjoint union of sets and the union of functions with disjoint domains. The γ and
the φ in the second and third case above are the minimal types (w.r.t. v) such that (Γ with K for N ) ` N .
Remark 2. Notice that it is not always the case that Γ with K for N is defined; however, if it is defined then N is
well-typed.
Lemma 3 (Subject Congruence). If Γ ` N and N ≡ N ′ then Γ ` N ′.
Lemma 4 (Substitutivity). Let W be such that FV(W ) = ∅. Then, the following facts hold:
(1) If Γ , vX : τ `u W ′ : τ ′′ and Γ `v W : τ ′, for some τ ′ w τ , then Γ `u{W/X} W ′{W/X} : τ ′′.
(2) If Γ , vX : τ `u P and Γ `v W : τ ′, for some τ ′ w τ , then Γ `u{W/X} P{W/X}.
Proof. The proof of the first claim is similar to the corresponding one in [19], once the subtyping relation used is that
defined in Table 7. To prove the second claim, we distinguish three cases (the last one relies on the first two) according
to the structure of parameter X : X can be u (and clearly u is a variable), or X can be x 6= u, or X can be y@z. We
now proceed by induction on judgement Γ , vX : τ `u P and considers only the first two cases above; the third one
is recovered by considering {a@l/y@z} as the composition of the two substitutions {a/y} and {l/z}.
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The base case is trivial. For the inductive cases, the proof is tedious. We just show the most delicate case, i.e.
when (D-T-OUT) is the last rule applied; for notational convenience, we let Γ ′ = Γ , vX : τ . By hypothesis,
P = v1!〈[W ′]r 〉.P ′; thus, Γ ′ `u v1 : r ′(τ1), val(Γ ′(u)) ⊆ r ′, Γ ′ `u W ′ : τ2 for some τ2 w τ1, u ∈ r ,⋃
w∈r val(Γ (w)) ⊆ reg(τ1) and Γ ′ `u P ′. Clearly, u{W/X} ∈ r{W/X}; moreover, by claim (1) of this lemma and
by induction, we have that Γ `u{W/X} v1{W/X} : r ′(τ1), Γ `u{W/X} W ′{W/X} : τ2 and Γ `u{W/X} P ′{W/X}.
We still have to prove that val(Γ (u{W/X})) ⊆ r ′ and ⋃w∈ r{W/X} val(Γ (w)) ⊆ reg(τ1). By hypothesis, τ v τ ′;
thus, it holds that val(Γ (W )) ⊆ val(Γ (X)). Hence, we can state that val(Γ (u{W/X})) ⊆ val(Γ ′(u)) ⊆ r ′
and
⋃
w∈ r{W/X} val(Γ (w)) ⊆
⋃
w∈r val(Γ (w)) ⊆ reg(τ1) (it suffices to distinguish if X = u or not). Thus,
Γ `u{W/X} (v1{W/X})!〈[W ′{W/X}]r{W/X}〉.P ′{W/X}, as required. 
Theorem 4 (Subject Reduction). If N is well-typed and K F N 7−→ K ′ F N ′ then N ′ is well-typed.
Proof. By definition, there exists a typing environment Γ such that Γ ` N . Thus, because of Remark 2, it suffices to
prove that Γ with (K ′ − K ) for N ′ is defined. Similarly to Theorem 1, we proceed by induction on the length of the
inference leading to K F N 7−→ K ′ F N ′ and we do not consider K and K ′ anymore.
Base step: We reason by case analysis on the axioms (i.e. the first five rules) of Table 8.
(Dpi -COMM). In this case, K ′ − K = ∅; thus, Γ with (K ′ − K ) for N ′ = Γ if and only if Γ ` lrprd [[P{W/X} | Q]].
By hypothesis, Γ `l a?(X).P | a!〈[W ]r 〉.Q; thus, by rule (D-T-PAR), Γ `l a?(X).P and Γ `l a!〈[W ]r 〉.Q.
By rules (D-T-IN) and (D-T-OUT), we know that Γ `l a : r ′(τ ), Γ `l W : τ ′ for some τ ′ w τ ; moreover
Γ , lX : τ `l P and Γ `l Q. Since we assumed that Γ does not contain variables (otherwise Γ 6` N ), we can
state that W is a closed message. Thus, we can apply Lemma 4 and obtain that Γ `l P{W/X}. This suffices
to conclude.
(Dpi -GO). This case is simpler.
(Dpi -NEWLOC). In this case, K ′ − K = {k}; thus, Γ with (K ′ − K ) for N ′ is defined if and only if Γ , lk :
φ ` lrp∪{k}rd∪{k} [[P]] ‖ k
rp∪{k}
rd∪{k} [[stop]] for some locality type φ. By hypothesis, Γ ` l
rp
rd [[(νk)P]]; thus, by rule
(D-T-LRES), it holds that Γ , lk : > F {k}[∅]rd∪{k}rp∪{k} `l P . We can now easily conclude.
(Dpi -NEWCHAN). This case is similar.
(Dpi -CALL). This case proceeds like in Theorem 1.
Inductive step: We reason by case analysis on the last applied operational rule, i.e. (Dpi -SPLIT), (Dpi -PAR) or
(Dpi -STRUCT). These cases are similar to Theorem 1 and, thus, are omitted. 
We now consider type safety. We could proceed like for CKLAIM, by exploiting a tagged language. However, in
the Dpi setting, we can formulate and prove the safety property in a simpler (but coarser) way. The intuition is that a
Dpi typing environment already associates a region to each (free) name of a net. Thus, we can define a notion of safety
w.r.t. a typing environment in the following way:
Definition 4 (Safety). A net N is Γ -safe if for any lrdrp [[P]] in N , it holds that l ∈ reglΓ (P).
This definition is somehow “less accurate” than Definition 2 in that all the occurrences of the same name are now
associated with the same tag. To obtain the finer property, we should tune the theory presented in Section 3.3; we omit
the details and go on working with Definition 4.
Theorem 5 (Type Safety). If Γ ` N then N is Γ -safe.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the length of the inference of judgement Γ ` N . The proof relies on the
check val(Γ (u)) ⊆ reguΓ (go v.P) in rule (D-T-GO), the check val(Γ (u)) ⊆ r in (D-T-IN) and val(Γ (u)) ⊆ r ′ in
(D-T-OUT). 
Type soundness now easily follows (the definition of r -subnet and the proof of the claim are similar to the
corresponding ones in Section 3.3). Notice that type soundness can be recovered as an instance of localised type
soundness.
Corollary 3 (Localised Type Soundness). Let the r-subnet of N be defined and well-typed in Γ . If K FN 7−→∗ K ′FN ′
then the r ′-subnet of N ′ is defined and Γ ′-safe, where r ′ = r ∪ (K ′ − K ) and Γ ′ = Γ with (K ′ − K ) for N ′.
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Table 9
Ambients syntax
n,m, p, . . . ∈ A AMBIENTS NAMES
x, y, z, . . . VARIABLES
u ::= n | x IDENTIFIERS
P ::= PROCESSES
0 (empty)
| 〈[u]r 〉 (datum)| α.P (prefixing)
| P1|P2 (parallel composition)| (νn) (name restriction)
| ∗P (replication)
| u[[P]] (ambient)
α ::= ACTIONS
(x) (receive)
| in u (enter u)
| out u (exit u)
| open u (open u)
5. Mobile Ambients Calculus
Finally, we apply our approach to Mobile Ambients Calculus [5] (in the following, we will shorten it as Ambients).
The calculus relies on the notion of ambient that can be thought of as a bounded place where processes cooperate.
This notion is similar to that of node, but differently from CKLAIM and Dpi nodes, ambients can be hierarchically
structured and can be moved as a whole under the control of processes.
The syntax of the calculus is given in Table 9. There is only one category of names, namely that of ambient names
A , ranged over by n. Identifiers, ranged over by u, v, w, denote ambient names and variables (ranged over by x),
and represent both the target of process actions and the data exchanged during communication. Communication is
asynchronous and anonymous (no place or communication channel is explicitly referred), and takes place locally
within a single ambient.
In Ambients, everything is a process, namely, differently from CKLAIM and Dpi , there is no distinction
among processes, nodes and nets. Other than the standard process operators, i.e. empty process, prefixing, parallel
composition, name restriction and replication, we have 〈[u]r 〉, that represents message u tagged with region r within
the current ambient, and n[[P]], that represents an ambient with name n and process P running inside. An ambient,
hence, has a name, a collection of local processes and a collection of subambients. Notice that nothing prevents
existence of two or more ambients with the same name, possibly enclosed within the same ambient. Process actions
are:
• (x): receives a message u within the current ambient and replaces x with u in the continuation;
• in u: moves the ambient enclosing the process executing the action in a sibling ambient whose name is u;
• out u: moves the ambient enclosing the process executing the action out of its enclosing ambient provided that
this is named u;
• open u: dissolves the boundary of an ambient named u and unleashes u’s content.
Identifiers occurring in processes can be bound. More precisely, prefix (x).P binds variable x , while (νn)P binds
name n; in both cases, P is the scope of the binding. The set of free variables FV( ), α-conversion and closed nets are
defined accordingly.
Differently from the calculi previously presented, in Ambients there is no need to associate regions rd/rp to
ambients. Indeed, as processes are confined within ambients, new data/code can enter an ambient n only because
an ambient boundary is dissolved by an action open executed within n. Since this action is under the control of n, no
(static nor dynamic) check is needed to prevent the unwanted arrival of undesired data/code. At most, some control
can be carried on the ambients that n can open; but this is an orthogonal task.
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5.1. Typing ambients nets
We adopt a static typing approach, like for Dpi . For the sake of presentation, here we only illustrate the key features
of the application of our approach to Ambients and relegate all technical details to Appendix. Ambients types are
defined as follows:
T ::= Shh | r1 F r2 F r3[T ]
Intuitively, an ambient u has type r1 F r2 F r3[T ] if its name is in r3 (this is useful only if u is a variable), it can be
seen by all ambients in r1 and enclosed within all ambients in r2. Moreover, the ambient hosts processes exchanging
data of type T , the local conversation topic. Topics of conversations were introduced in [4]; here we use them in a
similar way and denote with Shh the absence of exchanges in the ambient. Moreover, we always assume that types
are well-formed, i.e., for all r1 F r2 F r3[·], it holds that r2 ⊆ r1. Finally, we let cont(r1 F r2 F r3[·]) = r2 and
look(r1 F r2 F r3[·]) = r1.
The main judgement is Γ ` P and states that P is well-typed under the assumptions Γ . A type environment Γ is
a finite partial function mapping ambient names and variables to types (a well-formedness condition similar to (Ě) in
Section 4.1 is assumed, see Appendix). The key requirement to type check Ambients processes is that
whenever ambient n is contained in ambient m (i.e., m[[n[[· · ·]] | · · ·]]), (ğ)
it must hold that cont(Γ (m)) ⊆ cont(Γ (n))
By construction, we have that cont(Γ (n)) ⊆ look(Γ (n)). These conditions together ensure that, if m is opened while
still containing n, n can be seen by the ambient enclosing m. For example, consider the following process:
k[[ m[[n[[〈[d]r 〉 | · · ·]] | open n]] | open m ]]
If the process is well-typed, we know that k ∈ cont(Γ (m)) ⊆ {m} ∪ cont(Γ (m)) ⊆ cont(Γ (n)) ⊆ r (these inclusions
follow by the premises of the typing rules). This means that both k and m can see datum d; hence, the execution of
actions open n and open m does not break well-typedness, as intended.
Well-typedness for Ambients processes is defined as follows.
Definition 5 (Well-Typed Ambients Processes). A process P is well-typed in Γ if Γ ` P . P is well-typed if there
exists a typing environment Γ such that P is well-typed in Γ .
Remark 3. To conclude this section, we want to remark that most of the intricacies in the setting of the Ambients
calculus (especially, the need for requirement (ğ) above) are related to the presence of action open. Indeed, other
calculi, that have been derived from Ambients by removing such a primitive, can be typed very similarly to Dpi . As
a first example, we consider M3 [6] where action open is replaced by a primitive for process migration, to, which
is in the same vein of CKLAIM’s eval and Dpi ’s go . In this setting, types look like Dpi ’s locality types and are
defined as r F r ′[T ]rprd (the meaning of r , r ′, rd and rp is like in Dpi , while T is the topic of conversation). As another
example, we consider Boxed Ambients [2] where action open is replaced with primitives for (non-local) parent/child
communication. Types still take the form r F r ′[T ]rprd , but more checks are needed in the typing phase to ascertain that
data are exchanged correctly. Indeed, the ability of performing (limited forms of) remote communications introduces
new possibilities to forge data regions.
5.2. Ambients operational semantics
Ambients processes are executed according to the reduction relation −→ defined in Table 10. Like for the
previous calculi, −→ relates configurations of the form A F P , where A is now a set of ambient names such that
n(P) ⊆ A ⊂fin A . Function n(P) returns the set of ambient names occurring in P . As usual, −→∗ stands for the
reflexive and transitive closure of −→.
The semantics is given modulo a structural congruence relation, ≡, equating α-convertible processes and stating
that “|” is commutative, associative and with 0 as identity.
We now comment on the Ambients peculiar operational rules. Rule (A-IN) says that the ambient n performing
the action enters the sibling ambient m. If no sibling m can be found, the operation gets stuck until such a sibling
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Table 10
Ambients operational semantics
(A-IN)
n[[in m.P | Q]] | m[[R]] −→ m[[n[[P|Q]] | R]]
(A-CALL)
∗P −→ ∗P | P
(A-OUT)
m[[n[[out m.P | Q]] | R]] −→ n[[P|Q]] | m[[R]]
(A-RES)
A F (νn)P −→ A unionmulti {n} F P
(A-OPEN)
open m.P |m[[R]] −→ P | R
(A-PAR)
A F P1 −→ A′ F P ′1
A F P1|P2 −→ A′ F P ′1|P2
(A-COMM)
〈[m]r 〉 | (x).Q −→ Q{m/x}
(A-AMB)
A F P −→ A′ F P ′
A F n[[P]] −→ A′ F n[[P ′]]
(A-STRUCT)
P1 ≡ P ′1 A F P ′1 −→ A′ F P ′2 P ′2 ≡ P2
A F P1 −→ A′ F P2
exists; if more than one sibling m exists, any one of them can be chosen. Symmetrically, rule (A-OUT) says that the
ambient n performing the action exits its enclosing ambient if this is named m; otherwise, the action gets stuck. Rule
(A-OPEN) says that the boundary of ambient n is dissolved and n’s content is unleashed, possibly within the ambient
performing the action. If no ambient n is found, the operation gets stuck until such an ambient exists; if more than
one ambient n exists, any one of them can be chosen. Rule (A-COMM) accounts for asynchronous communication
between co-located processes; again, the static typing enables the communication without any runtime overhead. In
rule (A-RES), the set A of names already in use is exploited to choose a fresh name n. Finally, rule (A-AMB) states
that, if the content of an ambient evolves, then the whole ambient evolves accordingly.
Before concluding, let us implement in Ambients the example presented in Section 2. The server and the client are
modelled as two sibling ambients whose names are nS and nC . Processes PC and PS now become
PC , (νpwd)(req[[out nC .in nS .〈nC , pwd, [cc info]{nC ,nS ,req}〉]]| open pwd.(y). < modify pwd y and access the service >)
PS , ∗open req.(x1, x2, x3). < check credit card info x3 > .
(νp)(x2[[out nS .in x1.〈[p]{x1,x2,nS}〉]] |
< handle password modifications and provide the service >)
Ambient req is used as an access point to the server; indeed, it brings message 〈nC , pwd, [cc info]{nC ,nS ,req}〉 out of
the client and then in the server, where it is dissolved, thus enabling the reception of the message. This is carried on
by the following reductions (where, like before, the sets A of names in use are omitted):
nC [[PC ]] | nS[[PS]]
−→∗ nC [[open pwd. · · ·]] | nS[[PS]] | req[[in nS .〈nC , pwd, [cc info]{nC ,nS ,req}〉]]−→ nC [[open pwd. · · ·]] | nS[[PS | req[[〈nC , pwd, [cc info]{nC ,nS ,req}〉]]]]−→ nC [[open pwd. · · ·]] | nS[[PS | 〈nC , pwd, [cc info]{nC ,nS ,req}〉 | (x1, x2, x3). · · ·]]
Upon verification of the credit card information, the server creates a new password p that is delivered back to nC by
the ambient pwd. Again, this last ambient serves as an access point to the client and acts like ambient req above.
By comparing this implementation with that in Dpi , one can notice how channels can be implemented in Ambients.
Intuitively, channels (e.g., req and pwd in the example above) are rendered as pilot ambients that bring messages
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from the sender to the receiver, by following possibly complex routing paths. Once they have reached their final
destination, such ambients are opened so that the messages they carry on are unleashed and can be retrieved by the
receiver.
6. A realistic example: Implementing a multiuser system
In this section we want to further illustrate our approach. To this aim, we use the framework presented so far
to program a simple but meaningful example in CKLAIM; the implementations in the other calculi can be derived
straightforwardly. For the sake of readability, we will use parameterised process definitions and strings. Moreover, we
borrow from [13] polyadic communication, i.e. the possibility of exchanging tuples of data, and the primitive read
that behaves similarly to in but, after its execution, it leaves the accessed data in the TS. Clearly, the type inference for
actions readworks similarly to that for actions in (by adding region annotations to parameters occurring in templates).
We present the behaviour of a simple UNIX-like multiuser system, where users can login (exploiting a password-
based approach) and use the system functionalities, which consist in reading/writing files or executing programs. For
the sake of presentation, we shall present the system in three steps and, finally, we shall merge them together. Let lS
be the address of the server, > be its data trust region and ∅ be its process trust region (thus no user can spawn code
to lS).
User identification.We start with programming the identification of different users via passwords. Localities play the
role of user IDs. Let lp be a private repository used by lS to record the registered users and their passwords. Thus, lp
hosts the tuples
〈l1, [pwd1]{l1,lp,lS}〉 | . . . | 〈ln, [pwdn]{ln ,lp,lS}〉
Let l be a user wanting to log in lS . If l is already known to lS (i.e. it is one of the li s), then l can use a process like
out(“login”, l, [pwd]{l,lS})@lS .in(“logged”)@lS . . . .
for communicating with the server process
Login(lp) , ∗in(“login”, !u, !z)@lS .read(u, z)@lp.out([“logged”]{lS ,u})@lS
Intuitively, l requires a connection by sending its user ID (its locality) and its password; the server checks if this
information is correct and sends back an ack, activating the continuation of the computation at l. Notice that the
region annotations of pwd and “logged” rule out attacks of a nasty intruder aimed at cancelling the request of login or
the corresponding ack, and preserve the secrecy of the password.
If the user is not registered at lS yet, he can send an “hello” request to the server containing its address and wait for
a password
out([“hello”]{l,lS}, l)@lS .in(“registered”, !pwd)@lS . . . .
The server then handles this request with the process
NewUser(lp) , ∗in(“hello”, !u)@lS .newloc(pwd).out(u, [pwd]{u,lS ,lp})@lp.
out(“registered”, [pwd]{lS ,u})@lS
Of course, a locality l ′ different from l can send lS a request for a new password pretending to be l: the only difference
with the “hello” message given above is that the message now should contain also l ′ in the data region. However, the
server will report the new password to l and the region associated to the password will ensure that pwd will not leave
l. Thus, l ′ can withdraw pwd only by sending a process to l and then acting at l with the new password. This can be
possible only if l trusts l ′, implying that l accepts this ‘suspicious’ activity of l ′.
We now show the use of our typing theory in the setting just presented. In particular, we give evidence on how we
can prevent attacks aimed at cancelling messages and the activity of malicious users pretending to play the role of
other users.
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• Let lcanc be a locality hosting a process that aims at interfering with the login procedures by performing action
in(“hello”, !x)@lS . In this way, it removes the hello message sent by a new user l wanting to be connected with
the server lS . The system is modelled as follows
lcanc :: in(“hello”, !x)@lS .DONE ‖ lS :: NewUser(lp)
‖ l :: out([“hello”]{l,lS}, l)@lS .in(“registered”, !pwd)@lS . . . .−→ lcanc :: in(“hello”, !x)@lS .DONE
‖ l :: in(“registered”, !pwd)@lS . . . . ‖ lS :: NewUser(lp) | 〈[“hello”]{l,lS}, l〉−→/ lcanc :: DONE ‖ l :: in(“registered”, !pwd)@lS . . . . ‖ lS :: NewUser(lp)
Notice that the last transition cannot take place. As intended, the intruder running at lcanc is not enabled to withdraw
the tuple 〈[“hello”]{l,lS}, l〉 because lcanc 6∈ {l, lS} (see the runtime check of rule (CK-MATCH)).
• Let now lpret be a locality pretending to act on behalf of l, by trying to acquire a log to lS under the identity of l.
Let us examine the possible evolutions of the system:
lpret :: out(“hello”, l)@lS .in(“registered”, !pwd)@lS .DONE ‖ lS :: NewUser(lp)
−→ −→ −→ −→ lpret :: in(“registered”, !pwd)@lS .DONE
‖ lS :: NewUser(lp)| 〈“registered”, [pwd]{lS ,l}〉−→/ lpret :: DONE ‖ lS :: NewUser(lp)
Again, the last reduction cannot take place because lpret 6∈ {lS, l}. The only way for lpret to withdraw
datum 〈“registered”, [pwd]{lS ,l}〉 is to spawn a process to l (if it exists in the net) executing action
in(“registered”, !pwd)@lS (that would be enabled, because l ∈ {lS, l}). Such a migration, however, must be
authorised by l (indeed, it can take place only if lpret ∈ r lp, where r lp is the node region controlling migrations
to l).
The file system.We now consider a server handling a file system where different users can write/read data. Let l f be
a private repository used by lS to store the files. A file named N , whose content is the string S, that can be read by
users in r and written by users in r ′, is stored in l f as the process
CN , 〈N , [“read”]r∪{lS ,l f} , [“written”]r ′∪{lS ,l f}〉 | 〈N , S〉
Intuitively, “read” and “written” are just dummy data used to properly store regions r and r ′. Then, the server handles
requests for reading and writing files with the following processes
Read(l f ) , ∗in(“read”, !u, !n)@lS .read(n, !zr , !zw)@l f .read(n, !z)@l f .out([zr ]{l f ,lS ,u}, n, z)@u
Write(l f ) , ∗in(“write”, !u, !n, !z)@lS .read(n, !zr , !zw)@l f .in(n, !z′)@l f .
out(n, z)@l f .out([zw]{u,l f ,lS}, n)@u
Intuitively, the first in action collects the request for reading/writing the file named n performed by locality u; then
the following read action, once type checked, verifies if the locality replacing u has the read/write privilege on file n
(see below). Finally, the required operation is performed (the content of the file is read or the old content is replaced
with the new one) and an acknowledgement (containing the kind of operation performed, the name of the file and, in
the “read” case, also its content) is reported to u.
We now show how our types can control read accesses to files. There are two features devoted to this aim: the
type inference phase carried on process Read(l f ) and the runtime checks of the operational semantics (in particular,
the premise of rule (CK-IN)). We first give the type inference; recall that absence of region annotations stands
for >.
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{lS, u} ⊆ s Γ1 ` nil lS Γ1 ` nil
Γ1 ` out ([zr ]s, n, z)@u lS Γ2 ` out ([zr ]s, n, z)@u
Γ3 ` read (n, !z)@l f .out([zr ]s, n, z)@u lS
Γ4 ` read (n, !z)@l f .out([zr ]s, n, z)@u
Γ5 ` read (n, !zr , !zw)@l f .read(n, !z)@l f .out([zr ]s, n, z)@u lS
Γ6 ` read (n, [!zr ]s, [!zw]{lS})@l f .read(n, !z)@l f .out([zr ]s, n, z)@u
∅ ` in (“read”, !u, !n)@lS .read(n, !zr , !zw)@l f .
read(n, !z)@l f .out([zr ]s, n, z)@u
lS ∅ ` in (“read”, [!u]{ls }, !n)@lS .read(n, [!zr ]s, [!zw]{lS})@l f .
read(n, !z)@l f .out([zr ]s, n, z)@u
where we let s , {l f , lS, u} and
Γ1 , Γ3 unionmulti {z : {lS}} Γ2 , Γ1 + {zr : s, n : >, z : >}
Γ3 , Γ5 unionmulti {zr : {lS}, zw : {lS}} Γ4 , {u : {lS}, n : >, zr : s, zw : {lS}}
Γ5 , u : {lS}, n : {lS} Γ6 , u : {lS}, n : >
We now call TRead(l f ) the process obtained from the typing inference above. Let l be a user wanting to read a file
named FILE associated to a read region ρ = {l f , lS, l, . . .}. FILE is then stored at l f as the process
CFILE , 〈FILE , [“read”]ρ , [“written”]ρ′〉 | 〈FILE, content〉
The evolution of user l is
l :: out(“read”, l,FILE)@lS .in(“read”,FILE, !cont)@l.P ‖ l f :: CFILE ‖ lS :: TRead(l f )
−→ −→ l :: in(“read”,FILE, !cont)@l.P ‖ l f :: CFILE
‖ lS :: TRead(l f ) | read(FILE, [!zr ]{l f ,lS ,l}, [!zw]{lS})@l f . . . .
Now, action read(FILE, [!zr ]{l f ,lS ,l}, [!zw]{lS})@l f is enabled, because {l f , lS, l} ⊆ ρ; thus, the content of FILE will
be transferred to l that, in turn, will be enabled to retrieve it (by binding content to the variable cont) and use it in
P . Notice that, if a user l ′ 6∈ ρ had tried to carry on the same task, these actions would not have been enabled, since
{l f , lS, l ′} 6⊆ ρ.
Executing code-on-demand. In this last setting, a user can dynamically download some code from the server to
perform a given task. The server stores all the downloadable processes as executable (named) files in a private locality
lc. For each executable file named N , whose code is P and that is downloadable by nodes in r , the server stores in lc
the component
CN , 〈N , [“downloaded”]r∪{lS ,lc}〉 |∗ in(req, N , !u)@lc.read(N , !ze)@lc.eval( eval(out([ze]{lc,lS ,u}, N )@u.P)@u )@lS
Then, when a user wants to download some code, the server handles its request with the process
Execute(lc) , ∗in(“execute”, !u, !n)@lS .out(req, n, u)@lc
Notice that lc cannot directly send P for execution to u because (the locality associated to) u cannot have lc in its trust
region (since lc is fresh). Thus, P must firstly cross lS and then, if lS is in the process trust region of u (which we
assume it is the case), the code-on-demand procedure successfully terminates, by also reporting an ack to the user.
The system. Finally, we can put together the activities shown so far to obtain the implementation of the whole
server. Thus, the (not yet typed) initial configuration of lS would be
lS > ::∅ newloc(u1).newloc(u2).newloc(u3) .
< set up u1 with the identites and passwords of the users > .
< set up u2 with the data of the file system > .
< set up u3 with the downloadable processes > .
(NewUser(u1) | Login(u1) | Read(u2) | Write(u2) | Execute(u3) )
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Our example simplifies UNIX behaviour in two major aspects. Firstly, we did not require that a user must login before
using the functionalities offered by the system; secondly, the files/programs are put by the system and not by the
users. Both these choices were driven by the aim of simplifying the presentation; however, our setting could be easily
enriched with more refined and realistic features.
Finally, we want to remark that, by exploiting the dummy data “read”, “written” and “downloaded”, we have been
able to enforce an access control policy by only using region annotations. This confirms that, in spite of its simplicity,
the approach we presented in this paper is very powerful.
7. Conclusions and related work
The main contribution of this paper is the introduction of a typing discipline for fixing the network region where
data and processes can safely move. Our types can prevent execution of those actions that could compromise region
specifications. To provide evidence of the generality of our approach, it has been applied to three paradigmatic calculi
for global computing with quite different design choices. The technique developed works even when only a local
knowledge of the net during the compilation can be assumed and misbehaving entities are present in the system. A
few example applications implemented in all the three calculi have been also shown.
We want to remark that our theory permits to naturally implement a security mechanism based on sandboxes. We
already noticed, in the introduction, that nodes can be seen as logical partitions of a single physical machine. By
exploiting this intuition, one can split each machine into an appropriate number of nodes each with its own security
policy. In this way, fine grained security policies can be programmed to guarantee that untrusted processes (e.g.,
coming from unchecked nodes) are accepted only at dedicated nodes and that from these nodes remote operations and
spawning of threads are not permitted.
We conclude by commenting on the three instantiations of our region-based approach; this should also shed light
on the different choices and paradigms underlying the considered calculi. We shall also discuss possible extensions
and confront our work with that of other researchers.
Assessment. Differently from that of Dpi and Ambients, the typing of CKLAIM requires some dynamic checks; this
feature, however, is orthogonal to data secrecy and only depends on the underlying process calculus. In fact, these
runtime checks could be avoided, and a typing discipline similar to that of Ambients could be developed for CKLAIM
too, by additionally requiring that all data exchanged within a node have the same type. However, we find it too
demanding to force a CKLAIM node to contain only data of the same type. On the contrary, Dpi channels can be
reasonably assigned a fixed type because they can be seen as methods a node supplies to the processes it hosts, and
ambients can be reasonably assigned the same type because, due to their hierarchical organisation, they could be
thought of as logical partitions of the same memory space.
There is a thread-off between simplicity, efficiency and implementability. The type system for CKLAIM is quite
simple and easily implementable (types are just sets and operations on types are unions, intersections, subset
inclusions, . . . ). Clearly, its runtime semantics is less efficient because of the dynamic checks in rules (CK-OUT),
(CK-EVAL), (CK-IN) and (CK-MATCH). Nevertheless, we consider reasonable this dynamic burden, since it only
involves efficiently implementable operations on sets. On the contrary, Dpi and Ambients have very efficient runtime
semantics (no type related check is present) at the expense of more involved static semantics. Also implementability
is not straightforward: a preliminary implementation for the (simpler) type system of [19] appeared in a very technical
paper [21]; type inference algorithms for Ambients-like calculi are even more complex (see, e.g., [29,6,12]). Since
our type systems for Dpi and Ambient do rely on [19] and [4] respectively, we believe that they will also inherit the
problems related to the implementation.
Finally, notice that in the setting of Dpi and Ambient explicit tagging of locations/data could seem useless, because
no runtime check is ever performed. It might then appear more natural to leave the syntax untagged and record all type
related information in the typing environment. The main drawback of this solution is that it would require a global
(centralised) knowledge of all types. Tagging, instead, permits storing and inferring typing information locally, and
keeps the formalisms closer to programmers’ needs.
Possible extensions. Node regions could be handled more dynamically by extending the calculi we presented with
actions for adding and removing nodes from regions (in this way, e.g., nodes could choose whether to trust newly
created ones). However, this more expressive framework would require additional runtime checks. In particular, none
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of the two guarantees illustrated at the beginning of Section 3.1 could then be issued after static checks; the type
system would then only permit inferring the regions of the arguments of process actions, and render dynamic checks
more efficient.
Related work.Much work has been recently devoted to designing languages for mobile processes that come equipped
with security mechanisms based on, e.g., type systems [19,4,2,6,13] or control and data flow analysis [16,25,9,1]. The
approach presented here is related to both these techniques. It exploits a type system to ensure confinement of data,
and guarantees that the semantics respects the annotations by relying on the typing phase. Typing keeps track of data
movements with a technique similar to control flow analysis.
Our work has been inspired by that on Confined-λ [20], a higher-order functional language that supports distributed
computing by allowing expressions at different localities to communicate via channels. To limit the movement of
values, programmers can assign regions to them; a type system is defined that guarantees that each value can roam
only within the allowed region. There are however some differences with our approach. First of all, we consider not
only channels but also other communication media that require a more dynamic typing mechanism. Then, we permit
annotating only the relevant data while in [20] a programmer must declare a type (i.e. a region) for any constant,
function and channel. When typing a net, we do not rely on any form of global knowledge of the system; only
the annotations in the process are considered. We can infer this information by the local use of channels/ambients
(in Dpi and Ambients resp.) or by just examining the code (in CKLAIM). On the contrary, the type system in [20]
assumes a global typing environment for handling shared channels; this somehow conflicts with the features of a
global computing setting. Finally, we also give ‘localised’ formulations of the soundness theorem stating that well-
typedness of a given subnet is preserved also in presence of untyped contexts. This is a crucial property for global
computing systems where little assumptions on the behaviour of the context can be made.
Confinement has been also explored in the context of Java. In [27], confined types are introduced to confine classes
and objects within specific packages. Then, in [28], a static type system based on confined types is defined for a Java-
based calculus and its soundness is proved. Hence, in Java software modules play the role of our network regions, and
confinement is associated rather with objects encapsulation than with movements of data and processes.
The group types, originally proposed for the Ambients calculus [4] and then recast to the pi -calculus [3], have
purposes similar to our region annotations. A group type is just a name that can be dynamically created but cannot be
communicated (i.e. the scope of a group name cannot be extended). It permits to control name visibility in different
regions of a net: a fresh name belonging to a fresh group can never be communicated to any process outside the scope
of the group. Group types can then be used to handle processes and ambients movements, and in general to prevent
accidental or malicious leakage of private names without using more complex dependent types (see, e.g., [22]). Notice
that restricted names can be handled in a more flexible way in our framework by readily adapting the use of groups
or, even better, of the abstract names from [22]. However, differently from our approach, when exploiting groups or
abstract names some global knowledge is still necessary for taking into account the types of the names occurring free
in a net.
Group types have also been used in region-based memory management where the focus is on efficiency, rather than
on distribution and mobility. For instance, in [7] a connection between memory regions and group types is established
and a variant of the pi -calculus equipped with group types is used as a device to simplify the proof of correctness of
dynamic memory management.
Finally, we want to consider a lower level approach to protect visibility of data via encryption. Encrypted data can
appear everywhere in the net, but can be effectively used only by those users that know the decryption key. At an
abstract level, we can consider the content of an encrypted message to be visible only within the region containing
the nodes knowing the decryption key. Thus, it might appear that our approach could be implemented by resorting
to cryptographic primitives. However, we would like to stress an important difference. When encryption is used, the
producer of encrypted data can control the access to (plain) data only by controlling visibility of the decryption key.
But this can be hardly controlled: once a decryption key has been passed on, information leakage can reveal the key,
thus breaking the controllability of data. By exploiting our approach, the data producer can decide in advance which
are the users enabled to access the data; this information is preserved during any evolution of the system. However,
it should be noticed that indirect information flows can be generated; for an account of these problems and some
possible solutions we refer the interested reader to [17,18].
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Appendix. Technical details for Ambients
The typing procedure for Ambients processes is presented in Tables A.1 and A.2. It is somehow inspired by the
basic typing of [4] and also includes some features we have already presented for Dpi in Section 4.1.
The main judgement Γ ` P is defined by the rules in Table A.1. Intuitively, it states that P is well-typed under the
assumptions Γ . Differently from [5], we do not assign a type to processes and consider ill-typed those processes with
actions or messages occurring outside any ambient boundary. The latter choice reflects our intuition of ambients as
nodes of a net: a process cannot perform any computational activity if it has not been allocated within some ambient.
The main judgement relies on the auxiliary judgement Γ `u P defined by the rules in Table A.2. This judgement
is invoked in rule (A-T-AMB) of the main judgement and states that, when located within ambient u, process P can
be typed in the environment Γ . As a matter of notation, Γ , u 7→ T will stand for the type environment Γ ′ such that
Γ ′(v) = Γ (v), if v 6= u and u 6∈ dom(Γ ), and Γ ′(v) = T if v = u 6∈ dom(Γ ).
We use functions look(T ), cont(T ) and val(T ) to denote the regions r1, r2 and r3, respectively, when T =
r1Fr2Fr3[·]; look(Shh) denotes>. Finally, we also assume the following well-formedness condition on environments:
Let Γ (v) = r1 F r2 F r3[T ]. For every n ∈ r2 it must be that cont(Γ (n)) ⊆ r2. Moreover, if v ∈ A then r3 = {v};
otherwise, for each n ∈ r3, it must be that r1 ⊆ look(Γ (n)) and r2 ⊆ cont(Γ (n)).
We now briefly comment on some key features of the type system. For each occurrence of an identifier u, it is
verified that the ambient containing the occurrence, and all the possibly enclosing ambients, can see u (see rules
(AA-T-IN), (AA-T-OUT), (AA-T-OPEN) and (AA-T-SND) – and, indirectly, also rule (AA-T-AMB)). The crucial
rules are (AA-T-AMB) and (AA-T-IN): they ensure that the ambient hierarchy always maintains the invariant (ğ)
described in Section 5.1. Finally, rules (AA-T-RCV) and (AA-T-SND) exploit the topic of conversation to handle
communications, i.e. to assign types to input variables or to verify that messages are sent at the type required by the
ambient where the exchanges take place.
We now prove subject reduction and type safety for Ambients; the proofs are similar to those presented for Dpi in
Section 4.3. Here, we only illustrate the most significant differences. First, Γ with A for P is the least environment
that type checks P such that
Γ with A for P,
{
Γ if A = ∅
(Γ with A′ for P), n 7→ r1 F r2 F {n}[T ] if A = A′ unionmulti {n}
The technical lemmas to establish subject reduction are, like before, subject congruence and substitutivity. Moreover,
we give a Lemma (crucial in the case for open) that formally justifies the invariant (ğ) given in Section 5.1.
Lemma 5 (Subject Congruence). If Γ `u P and P ≡ P ′ then Γ `u P ′. The claim holds also when replacing `u
with `.
Lemma 6 (Substitutivity). If Γ , x 7→ T `v P and Γ (n) = T , then Γ `v{n/x} P{n/x}.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on Γ , x 7→ T `v P . The proof is long and tedious because we must
inspect all typing rules; here, we explicitly consider one of them, namely (AA-T-IN). In what follows, for the sake of
readability, we let Γ ′ = Γ , x 7→ T .
Whenever (AA-T-IN) is the last rule applied in the inference, it must be that P = in u.Q. Thus, val(Γ ′(v)) ∪
cont(Γ ′(v)) ⊆ look(Γ ′(u)), val(Γ ′(u)) ∪ cont(Γ ′(u)) ⊆ cont(Γ ′(v)) and Γ ′ `v Q. By induction, we have that
Γ `v{n/x} Q{n/x}. Moreover, Γ (u{n/x}) = Γ ′(u); indeed, if u = x then Γ (u{n/x}) = Γ (n) = T = Γ ′(x),
otherwise Γ (u{n/x}) = Γ (u) = Γ ′(u). Similarly, Γ (v{n/x}) = Γ ′(v); this suffices to conclude the wanted
Γ `v{n/x} in (u{n/x}).Q{n/x}. 
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Table A.1
Main judgement for typing ambients
(A-T-EMPTY)
Γ ` 0
(A-T-PAR)
Γ ` P1 Γ ` P2
Γ ` P1|P2
(A-T-REPL)
Γ ` P
Γ ` ∗P
(A-T-AMB)
Γ `n P
Γ ` n[[P]]
(A-T-RES)
Γ , n 7→ r1 F r2 F {n}[T ] ` P
Γ ` (νn)P
Table A.2
Auxiliary judgement for typing ambients
(AA-T-NIL)
Γ `u 0
(AA-T-PAR)
Γ `u P1 Γ `u P2
Γ `u P1|P2
(AA-T-REPL)
Γ `u P
Γ `u ∗P
(AA-T-AMB)
val(Γ (u)) ∪ cont(Γ (u)) ⊆ cont(Γ (v)) Γ `v P
Γ `u v[[P]]
(AA-T-RES)
Γ , n 7→ r1 F r2 F {n}[T ] `u P
Γ `u (νn)P
(AA-T-IN)
val(Γ (v)) ∪ cont(Γ (v)) ⊆ look(Γ (u))
val(Γ (u)) ∪ cont(Γ (u)) ⊆ cont(Γ (v)) Γ `v P
Γ `v in u.P
(AA-T-OPEN)
val(Γ (v)) ∪ cont(Γ (v)) ⊆ look(u) Γ `v P
Γ `v open u.P
(AA-T-OUT)
val(Γ (v)) ∪ cont(Γ (v)) ⊆ look(Γ (u)) Γ `v P
Γ `v out u.P
(AA-T-RCV)
Γ (u) = r1 F r2 F r3[T ] Γ , x 7→ T `u P
Γ `u (x).P
(AA-T-SND)
Γ (v)=r1 F r2 F r3[T ] Γ (u)=T val(Γ (v)) ∪ cont(Γ (v)) ⊆
⋃
w∈r
val(Γ (w)) ⊆ look(T )
Γ `v 〈[u]r 〉
Lemma 7. If Γ `v P and val(Γ (u)) ⊆ cont(Γ (v)), then Γ `u P.
Proof. By induction on the length of judgement Γ `v P . The proof is easy because of well-formedness of Γ . 
Theorem 6 (Subject Reduction). Let A F P −→ A′ F P ′. Then
(1) Γ `n P implies that (Γ with A′ − A for P ′) `n P ′;
(2) P is well-typed implies that P ′ is well-typed.
Proof. The first claim is proved standardly, by induction on the length of the inference for A F P −→ A′ F P ′. The
most interesting cases are the following ones:
(A-OPEN). In this case P = open m.Q | m[[R]], while P ′ = Q | R. By hypothesis, Γ `n m[[R]] and Γ `n
open m.Q. By rules (AA-T-AMB) and (AA-T-OPEN), we also have that Γ `m R and Γ `n Q; moreover,
by Lemma 7, we have that Γ `n R, because, by the premise of rule (AA-T-AMB), we know that
n ∈ cont(Γ (m)). This suffices to conclude.
(A-COMM). In this case P = 〈[m]r 〉 | (x).Q, while P ′ = Q{m/x}. By hypothesis, Γ `n 〈[m]r 〉 and Γ `n (x).Q.
These judgements imply that Γ (m) = T and Γ , x 7→ T `n Q, where Γ (n) = r1 F r2 F {n}[T ]. By Lemma 6
it holds that Γ `n Q{m/x}, as required.
The second claim is proved similarly to Theorem 4. Indeed, it suffices to prove that Γ with A′−A for P ′ is defined,
where Γ is such that Γ ` P . The proof is by induction on A F P −→ A′ F P ′. Both for the base and for the inductive
case, we only consider the most significant cases; the other ones are simpler.
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(A-IN). In this case P = n[[in m.Q1 | Q2]] | m[[R]], while P ′ = m[[n[[Q1 | Q2]] | R]]; moreover, A′ = A. Thus,
we only prove that N ′ is well-typed in Γ . By hypothesis, Γ `m R, Γ `n Q2 and Γ `n in m.Q1. The last
judgement implies that {m} ∪ cont(Γ (m)) ⊆ cont(Γ (n)) and Γ `n Q1. We can easily conclude.
(A-RES). In this case, P = (νn)P ′ and A′ − A = {n}. Now, Γ with A′ − A for P ′ is Γ , n 7→ r1 F r2 F {n}[T ] if
there exist some r1, r2 and T that type P ′. The existence of these r1, r2 and T is ensured by the premise of
rule (A-T-RES), that is the last rule used to infer Γ ` (νn)P ′.
(A-AMB). By hypothesis, P = n[[Q]] and P ′ = n[[Q′]], because A F Q −→ A′ F Q′. Moreover, Γ `n Q; by the
first claim of this Theorem, this implies that (Γ with A′ − A for Q′) `n Q′. Thus, n[[Q′]] is well-typed, as
required. 
We now formulate and prove type safety and type soundness by following the guidelines of Section 4.3. We exploit
function regΓ (·) that is defined inductively as follows:
regΓ (0) , ∅ regΓ (P|Q) , regΓ (P) ∩ regΓ (Q) regΓ (u[[P]]) , look(Γ (u))
regΓ (in u.P) = regΓ (out u.P) = regΓ (open u.P) , look(Γ (u)) ∩ regΓ (P)
regΓ (〈[u]r 〉) ,
⋃
w∈r val(Γ (w)) regΓ (∗P) = regΓ ((x).P) , regΓ (P)
Definition 6 (Safety). A process P is Γ -safe if for any subambient u[[Q]] of P , it holds that val(Γ (u)) ⊆ regΓ (Q).
Theorem 7 (Type Safety). If Γ ` P then P is Γ -safe.
Proof. It suffices to prove that Γ `u P implies that val(Γ (u)) ⊆ regΓ (P). This is done by a standard induction on
the typing judgement. 
Like in Dpi , a localised formulation of type soundness can be given. Indeed, we can define the Γ -r -subprocess of
P as the process containing all the subambients n[[Q]] of P such that {n} ∪ {m : n ∈ cont(Γ (m))} ∪ cont(Γ (n)) ⊆ r .
Thus, n[[Q]] is part of the Γ -r -subprocess of P if and only if r contains n, all the ambients that n can contain and all
the ambients that can contain n. This amounts to say that at least all the subtree rooted in n and all the ancestors of n
in the ambient hierarchy must be typed to ensure the safety of data occurring in n. Again, since the Γ ->-subprocess
of P is P itself, the following theorem also states the soundness result when P is fully typed.
Theorem 8 (Localised Type Soundness). Let the Γ -r-subnet of P be defined and well-typed in Γ . If
A F P −→ ∗ A′ F P ′, then the Γ ′-r ′-subnet of P ′ is defined and Γ ′-safe, where r ′ = r ∪ (A′ − A) and
Γ ′ = Γ with A′ − A for P ′.
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